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DETERMINISM AND FREEWILL
OF
MULLAH MAHMOOD

WITH
TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION,
CRITICAL NOTES, ETC.

BY
ALI MAHDI KHAN, M. A.,
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'The Ideas of Plato', etc.*

WITH A FOREWORD

BY
The Hon'ble Dr. Sir Shah MUHAMMAD SULAIMAN,
Kt., M.A., LL.D.
Chief Justice, High Court, Allahabad.

JAMI-AL-ULOOM, ALLAHABAD
1934.

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FOREWORD.

The high standard, which Muslim philosophy and science attained, is now forgotten because the works of eminent Muslim philosophers and scientists are not available in European languages. This lack of appreciation has in its turn deprived the Western literature of the advantage of a comparative study of philosophical and scientific doctrines. If means could be found to reproduce the Muslim scientific and philosophical books in European languages, it would be a great addition to the stock of knowledge and would give a fresh impetus to the study of mediaeval thought and lead to further researches.

It is rather unfortunate that the work of Mullah Mahmood, which is the first to be made available to the English-knowing scholars, should be nothing but a short epistle, which was never intended to be a learned dissertation, much less an exhaustive treatise on the vexed problem of Determinism and Free Will. The explanation of this inappropriateness is twofold. First, his other works are very voluminous, but they are available in print only in Arabic. Indeed, his *Al Shams Al Bazigha* and *Al Faraid* are recognised books of authority in the Nizami system for advanced students. Secondly, the epistle is short and is the only work of his extant in the Persian language.

Mr. Ali Mahdi has taken enormous pains in comparing and correcting the manuscripts, and collecting authentic information about the author. His Introduction is the result of his research, his translation is literal and accurate, and his criticisms are fair. This treatise will show not only the scholarship of Mr. Ali Mahdi, his learning in Philosophy, and his knowledge of Arabic, but also the great facility with which he can himself write in Persian on such a technical subject. I only wish that the desire of Mr. Ali Mahdi to translate Mullah Mahmood's standard work *Al Shams Al Bazigha* will be fulfilled in the near future.

Mullah Mahmood's epistle has to be judged as an epistle, and not as an essay on the philosophical doctrine which it discusses. It was apparently addressed to an Amir of the Delhi Court, who himself was not a philosopher. The conclusion had to be put tersely and in a condensed form, as it would have been quite out of place to enter into a long argumentative discussion; nor would it have been appropriate to burden it with quotations from the works of other eminent philosophers. Its purpose was not so much a presentation of the whole doctrine as the formulation of the conclusion at which the author had arrived after consideration. It steered clear of the two well-known extremes and adopted a middle course, giving brief reasons why the extreme views should be rejected. The high-flown style was characteristic of the mediaeval age,

particularly in oriental countries. In order to judge its merit, one has to place oneself at about the middle of the 17th century, for it would be unfair to examine it from the present day standard. The claim for originality in discarding the two extreme views lies in the method of treatment, and can be appreciated only when it is borne in mind that those were days of manuscripts and not printing presses in India, and classical literature was not so easily accessible.

Human instinct engenders a belief in Free Will. One is conscious of one's discretion and option in choosing one of the two alternatives. But actual observations foster a conviction in determinism. We feel compelled by circumstances to adopt a particular course of action. All around us, there seems to be an ordered course of Nature, and the principle of causation appears to dominate all activities in the Universe. It looks as if the same set of causes invariably produce the same effect. Determinism means that the existing conditions are absolutely determined by the earlier conditions and they in their own turn unalterably determine the future conditions; that is, the present is the necessary result of the past, and the future will be the inevitable result of the present. The state of things created at the very inception has necessitated the fixation of the entire future history of the whole Universe. Nature is conceived as if it is bound to move along a definite course up to a pre-destined

end. Determinism, therefore, implies that if a complete description of the present existing conditions is given, then the future of the whole Universe and even of every part of it will be fully determined.

The growth of this philosophical doctrine of Determinism has had a chequered history in Europe. Great minds like Galileo and Newton were adherents of this principle, as they came to believe in a mechanical world. John Stuart Mill firmly stuck to this doctrine; and according to him, volitions were determined by motives, and motives were the result of antecedent conditions including states of mind as well as states of the body. Laplace conceived a mind which would be competent to foretell the progress of Nature for all eternity, if but the masses and their velocities were given. Voltaire considered it very singular that when all heavenly bodies obeyed eternal laws, there should be a little animal like man who could, in contempt of these laws, act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice. The French Encyclopaedists regarded that man, including both body and soul, was but a machine. Some physiologists and psychologists thought that Determinism appeared to be an adequate explanation of all vital phenomena, and that the laws of mechanics, physics, and chemistry were applicable to living matter as well.

The success of numerous scientific experiments in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries helped to

confirm the laws of causation and made the belief in Determinism firmer. When a minute examination of natural phenomena disclosed that Nature herself strictly obeyed certain inexorable laws of causation, the very foundations of the theory of Free Will were shaken. It almost seemed as if all distinction between living and non-living matter would altogether vanish, for the cells of all appeared to be formed of similar chemical constituents and had considerable resemblance to one another.

“Vitalism” furnished a sort of a compromise between Determinism and Free Will, by the hypothesis that the World is mechanical so far as inanimate objects are concerned, but its mechanism is modified within living bodies. There was an apparent purposefulness in life, and living organisms looked as organic wholes. The essential characteristic of living matter is a striving for a definite goal, which controls the growth of body and mind in a manner which a mere combination of the forces of mechanics and chemistry cannot bring about. Life is no doubt subject to the conditions imposed by the body in which it exists, and yet in some respects it is independent of its environments. In this way living organisms are wholly dissimilar to things that are not living.

The law of causation is an *a priori* assumption. It is not capable of absolute proof, though it has also not been conclusively disproved. It has been verified experimentally in a very limited number of

cases. Bertrand Russell, therefore, believes that causation need not necessarily control human volitions, which are different from mere physical phenomena. The law of causation suggested by science is an entirely distinct thing from human volition. There is in a limited sense a freedom of will inasmuch as our volitions are the result of our own desires, and our actions are not forced upon us by an outside force ; but our desires themselves are the result of the existing conditions of the body and mind. Schopenhaur's famous dictum that "Man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills" is now exploded.

It seems that western philosophy is coming back to what was propounded by Mullah Mahmood nearly three centuries ago. The basic principle of his doctrine also was that "Man has determined freedom and constrained volition ; his actions are voluntary, but his will is restrained."

No doubt in the 20th century Planck's Quantum Theory has brought to prominence a new conception that Nature does not proceed in a continuous fashion, but acts purely arbitrarily by sudden jumps and jerks. Einstein has carried it to its logical conclusion that this discontinuity in Nature must necessarily destroy the law of causation itself. Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy makes it impossible to know how Nature will act. This uncertainty is not merely subjective, but is

inherent in the Universe. The old philosophers thought that Nature abhors vacuum ; but it is now supposed that Nature abhors continuity and precision above all things.

In modern days philosophic determinism finds little support from physics. The supposed predictions are regarded as mere statements of probability. Greater knowledge can give us only greater approximation, but no real certainty. There is a certain amount of determinism in large scale phenomena, but a measure of indeterminacy is introduced in small scale phenomena. Atoms, like any other vast crowd, are not controlled by predetermined forces, but only by statistical laws of probability. The success of the predictions depends on the average configuration of large numbers of individual entities. Averages are predictable merely because they are averages, irrespective of the nature of the constituents. In the behaviour of individuals there is uncertainty. For modern physicists, determinism has no meaning when applied to the atomic world.

But a closer examination of the theory of probability would show that the uncertainty is subjective in its character, due entirely to our incapacity to comprehend actions when we penetrate to finer details and have to take into account larger numbers. As the number of particles interacting on one another increases rapidly and enormously, possibilities of predictions diminish to an equal degree.

When we enter into infinitely small particles, the number of particles influencing one another is infinitely large, and the comprehension of their future behaviour comes to be beyond the capacity of the human mind.

The new idea, that Nature is no longer uniform and certain in her own mind, and that her operation follows nothing but mathematical laws of chance or probability, is nothing short of confusing subjective and objective determinism. Scientists have been driven to this conclusion by a supposed discontinuity in the propagation of radiation, severing the connection between cause and effect. Time is not very far off when the continuity of Nature will be re-established. Then the real distinction between a living organism and a non-living matter will come to be recognised ; and mind, or if we so prefer to call it, soul, would be found to be something distinct and separate from matter. The problem of determinism and indeterminism will then be solved in the way suggested by Mullah Mahmood that there is a middle course of a constrained freedom, and that Mind not being identical and interchangeable with Matter, is not absolutely tied down to it, though is certainly influenced by it when placed inside.

ALLAHABAD :

10-3-1934.

S. M. SULAIMAN.

P R E F A C E .

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله الذى خلق كل شئ ثم هدى
وعلى محمد وآله آلاف التحية والثناء

I had cherished for long the desire to put before the English-speaking public the immense treasure of the classical texts of Muslim philosophy, which I had the opportunity of examining critically while preparing my *History of Islamic Philosophy* ; but circumstances denied me time and opportunity as well as facilities of publication ; and now I seem to be pressed to the painful conclusion that the credit of editing a *corpus* of Muslim philosophical literature is reserved for somebody else. Even the *History of Islamic Philosophy* and the edition of Al-Farabi's *On Intellect*, which I prepared as a D. Litt. Scholar of the Allahabad University, have not as yet been published by the University for want of funds. I, therefore, busied myself with a humbler task, and took up the small booklet (leaving the bigger book, *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, for a more favourable opportunity) of the famous philosopher of my native city, Jaunpur, the publication of which will be easily arranged in my newly started JAMI-AL-ULOOM. Should it be possible for me during the brief span of my life to edit other books, the present one will only become the first of a series ; but should my resources remain as limited as they are at present, this booklet might serve to excite the interest of future students.

• The present edition has been prepared in intervals of business, with a sick mind and heart—amid mental worries, indifferent health, personal cares and pecuniary anxieties. An attempt has, nevertheless, been made to make it useful and instructive, much new ground has been broken, and valuable materials have been brought together. For the more scholarly reader and the serious student of philosophy, quotations from relevant portions of classical Arabic texts have been given in the Editor's Footnotes to the Original, a new feature of the book, which, if intelligently used, will ensure a thorough grounding in the difficult problem of Will so far as Muslim thought is concerned. These notes have been written in Persian, and not in English; for the books to which they refer are not accessible in English. One thing must be mentioned in this connection. With only one exception, references to philosophers of a later date than Mullah Mahmood have not been given, for reasons explained in the book; and this has excluded Mullah Sadr-Al-Deen of Shiraz, a great intellectual luminary, without reference to whom no problem of Muslim philosophy should be studied.

An author may be expected to acknowledge his obligations.

Muslim philosophy now-a-days is badly neglected by colleges and universities, is not even seriously studied by Maulavis, and it was not a subject in the Allahabad University in my day. As a result,

what I owe to others, I owe entirely to classical writers, the living dead with whom I have passed my days for the last seven years.

In the actual preparation of the book, I am deeply indebted to my reverend and holy friend His Holiness Saiyid Muhammad Shabbar Sahib, *Mujtahid*, who patiently waded through all the Persian Footnotes to the Original, and corrected a few minor over-sights. I must ever feel deeply grateful to him for a service which I can never repay. I am also thankful to Saiyid Zain-al-Abdeen, alias Qutub Sahib, son of the late Maulavi Noor-al-Deen, the author of *Juunpurnama* and *History of Zafarabad*, for showing me the second part of the former book.

But my deepest obligations are due to the Hon'ble Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, the illustrious descendant of Mullah Mahmood, a fond lover of Islam and its culture, and a passionate seeker of learning and admirer of scholars, without whose active interest this book could never see the light of the day. He very kindly lent me the manuscript in his possession, placed at my disposal his family papers, settled many points in Mullah's life-history and his book, made valuable suggestions and went through the whole book in the manuscript form. He has always proved a bulwark of strength and a source of inspiration in my literary activities and my indebtedness to him is immense.

The list would be incomplete if I do not mention, my friend, Saiyid Izhar-al-Hasan, the Secretary of the JAMI-AL-ULOOM, Allahabad, who has written parts of the book by dictation, discussed points of history with me and prepared the Index. But apart from grudging neither time nor labour in the preparation of this book, he has been a ministering angel to me, keeping me on to work in moments of mental stress and physical strain, with mild persuasions, sweet chidings and opportune encouragements—a delicate and selfless, though thankless, piece of service which should be valued above everything else.

My thanks are also due to Mirza Abid Husain, the general editor of the JAMI-AL-ULOOM, who unfortunately could not help me more owing to his illness.

Criticisms and suggestions will always be accepted with thanks.

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Rani Mandi, Allahabad, ALI MAHDI KHAN.
December 25, 1933.

CONTENTS.

	Page.
Foreword 	v
Preface 	xiii
Table of Contents	xvii
Introduction :	

Chapter I.—The Native City of Mullah Mahmood.

The historic city of Jaunpur—The disaster of Jaunpur—The people of Jaunpur—The foreign scholars—Their great prestige—The Shiraz of India—Jaunpuri scholarship a branch of Indian Muslim culture—The point of difference: the purity of Jaunpuri culture—No independent school of Jaunpuri learning—Reasons: (a) Jaunpur not a political unit—(b) The saintliness of scholars—(c) The decadence of Muslim culture ... 1

Chapter II.—Mullah Mamood—the Man and His Work.

Sources—The Life of Mullah Mahmood—Ancestry—Date of birth—Education and study—Journey to Akbarabad—Pilgrimage to Mecca: Interview with Mir Baqir Damad—Project to

build an observatory—Sickness and death—His grave—Character — Religion — Mullah Mahmood's progeny—The works of Mullāh Mahmood—Learning and scholarship—Disciples—Bend of mind and schools of thought—The two Schools of Muslim learning—Mullah Mahmood's inclinations—Mullah Mahmood and Avicenna—The writings of Mullah Mahmood—(a) Literary : *Al Faraid Sharh-al-Fawaid*—(b) Philosophical—*Al Shams Al Bazigha*—*Al Dauhat Al Mayadat*—*Risalat fi Tahqiq Al Kulli wal Juzai*—*Risalat fi Tahqiq Irtifa Al Naqidhain*—*Risalah Jabr-o-Ikhtiar*—(c) Religious—(d) Miscellaneous ...

12

Chapter III.—Mullah Mahmood's Determinism and Freewill.

Its composition—The Text—The authenticity of the Text—Hafiz Abid Husain's Foreword—Language and Style — Analysis—Exposition and criticism — The Epistle : — (a) Language — (b) Nature of the problem—(c) Claim for originality—The problem of the Tract—The historical back-

ground of the problem—Mullah Mahmood's standpoint — The plan of the Tract—Detailed sectional exposition and criticism —I. Intuitive reason rejects determinism — II. The Mu'tazilite doctrine—III. Mullah Mahmood's creed—IV. Objections and their replies — (a) Will requires no determinative — The incomplete treatment of the problem—(b) Constrained Freedom should bear no responsibility— (c) Reward and punishment not justified—(d) Bodily punishment cannot be explained— (e) Forgiveness and intercession cannot be explained — Conclusion and reference to Sufism	56
The Translation :	
The Foreword of Hafiz Abid Husain—The Epistle of Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri—Determinism and Freewill by Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri	89
Index	109
Risala Jabr-o-Ikhtiar :	
The Original Persian Tract with full explanatory, critical and comparative footnotes in Persian and Arabic.	

THE INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

The Native City of Mullah Mahmood

The Historic City of Jaunpur. The traveller in North India, who takes up the loop-line of the East Indian Railway from Mughalsarai, will arrive, after a journey of 47 miles, at Jaunpur, the native city of Mullah Mahmood. When the train has left Zafarabad station and is on the Gonti bridge, the eyes fall upon the shattered visage of a city, the lifeless wreck and remnant of a great town—a sight touching in its silent gloomy majesty. Stretching from the railway line, on the right side, are to be seen domes, spires, minarets and mosques—all crumbled or crumbling, standing alone or in patches—and at some distance the massive gates of the famous mosques and a part of the old walls of the fort: 'all beggared and outraged', bewailing with myriads of tongues their past glory and 'wrongs which nature scarcely seems to heed'. But more numerous than these are graves, isolated or in groups, which mark the resting

places of kings, generals, soldiers, scholars, saints and divines, 'a world of pomp and state', whom the icy hand of death has buried in dust and mingled with forgotten ashes. Jaunpur was once the city of greatness and grandeur, but now its 'mighty heart is lying still', and it is the city of ruins and graves, soundly enjoying the dull sleep of decay with the ashes of its noble sons in its bosom.

The disaster of Jaunpur. The blind old dame of Destiny has been too cruel to Jaunpur. An ancient *Bhar* village, once the site of a Buddhist stupa, visited by Sri Ramachandra and Saiyid Salar Mas'ud Ghazi, and the Afghan and Mughal kings, the seat of Sher Shah for a time, the capital of the Eastern Province and the Sharqi Kingdom, the great centre of Muslim learning, the Shiraz of India : now merely a district with daily diminishing population and decaying habitation ! Destruction works havoc everywhere ; but the way in which it has done so in Jaunpur is unparalleled for cruelty. The old grandeur, of course, has passed away, but the ruins and remains have also vanished, and with a very few exceptions all traces have been wiped out. The marks of Hindu culture lie buried in the ruins of the Sharqi architecture, which themselves lie hidden in the remains of the Mughal buildings, and these buildings are buried in the walls of constructions of a later date ; for in Jaunpur usually the material of the older has been used for constructing the newer buildings. Kingdoms have been conquered but

not with so ruthless cruelty and revenge as was the Sharqi Kingdom ; for Bahlol Lodi, who finally defeated Sultan Husain in 1476 A. D. and completed the conquest of Jaunpur, razed to the ground all buildings and structures of the Sharqi dynasty. He could not even let the monumental mosques stand intact ; and Jaunpur saw, what probably no city has seen, a Muslim King battering against and pulling down the walls of a mosque. This dearth of marks and traces of cultures and kingdoms makes it very difficult to delineate in detail the political and intellectual ups and downs of Jaunpur. A history of Jaunpur remains yet to be written, and the student who should attempt to do this will have to do much spade work.* The present occasion does not admit of even the briefest account of the political history of Jaunpur, even so far as it is easily traceable.

*There are few useful works exclusively on the history of Jaunpur, like the two *Jaunpurnamas*. Much valuable material will, however, be found in *Gulshan-i-Ibrahimi* of Firishta, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* of Khwaja Nizam-al-Deen Ahmad, *Al Adab Al Baqia wal Abhas Al Baqia* of Abd-al-baqi of Jaunpur, the Archæological Survey of India, N. S. (I), 1889, the Archæological Survey Reports Volume XI (1887), the United Provinces Gazetteer, Volume XXVIII (Jaunpur), and Elliot and Dowsen, Volume VII, etc. The development of Jaunpuri learning can be best traced with the help of numerous literary biographies which have been so profusely written by Muslims in Arabic, Persian and Urdu, as well as some of the books of the Jaunpuri scholars

The People of Jaunpur. A remarkable feature of the history of Jaunpur is that the city does not seem to have ever enjoyed political peace for any length of time. The common population, which in early days consisted of *Bhars*, *Ahirs*, and low-caste Hindus, and later on was supplemented by Hindu converts to Islam, (the *Rahmat Ilahis*) and a few Afghan and Mughal adventurous families, was turbulent and required constant chidings from Delhi or the Provincial Government. The frequent turmoils seem to be the cause of constant changes in the locality and population of Jaunpur, and were in the long run responsible for the capital of the *Sharq* being transferred to Allahabad during Akbar's reign.

The Foreign Scholars. Side by side with this turbulent and war-minded inhabitants there had sprung up an important class of people, from the time of the Sharqi kings and back, composed of saints, divines, scholars and savants of learning, who lived in certain quarters of the city unaffected by the political changes. Nearly all of them were foreigners, natives of Persia, Arabia and Iraq, who had come to India, and after living for some time in

which are still extant. Some of the monuments and graves, scattered in the city and suburb of Jaunpur, possess very valuable engravings, and an intelligent student can also make good use of family papers preserved with some of the older families, though most of these records have been lost in the great Gomti Flood of 1871.

Delhi, Lahore and Agra, had migrated to Jaunpur where they could find a comfortable cosy corner for indulging in intellectual pastimes. It appears that they preferred Jaunpur, with its ignorant masses, to the above-named cities because they liked priesthood of the Muses better than attendance of the court, hated court honours for its troubles and jealousies, and wanted to live in a place where there should be no fear of rivalry of the learned which is more troublesome for serious lovers of learning than the apathy of the disinterested masses.

Their Great Prestige. The population of Jaunpur thus fell into two groups: one a turbulent mass of ignorant rustics who were a standing nuisance to the central government and a source of constant trouble to the governorships of the East, and the other a group of scholars, of whom, according to a famous reliable tradition, 1400 palanquins used to come out on occasions. These scholars had little to do with the political activities, they were usually respected by all governments, had frequently been granted free lands by the Jaunpuri or Delhi government, and lived in peace and prosperity. They were great men with a country-wide or even international reputation, and when they chose to give expression to their moral force, their might was seen to be invincible. The Sultan of Delhi was afraid of their decrees when in 1476 A. D. he spared the

four mosques of Jaunpur ; and Akbar, the Great Mughal, also was chided by the *Ulema* of Jaunpur when he indulged in irreligious activities after reducing the *Ulema* of Delhi, Lahore and Agra to subservience by his Infalliability Decree of 1579 A. D.

The Shiraz of India. These scholars had come in great numbers specially during the reigns of the Sharqi kings, and it was in those days that Jaunpur got the title of Shiraz of India. After the downfall of the Sharqi Kingdom, the families of scholars who had settled at Jaunpur continued to invite others who wanted to acquire learning, and this process continued down to the closing days of the Mughal Empire. After the downfall of the Sharqi Kingdom, new scholars and fresh families were patronized by the *Subedars* of Jaunpur and kings of Delhi.

Jaunpuri Scholarship a Branch of Indian Muslim Culture. The Jaunpuri learning and culture was, therefore, not of indigenous growth; but was due to the scholars who had come there from different places. This prevented the creation of a distinct bend of culture and learning which could be termed the characteristic Jaunpuri scholarship. Jaunpur was not a centre of scholarship, but a centre of scholars. These scholars, or their fathers and teachers, were in the majority of cases immigrants who had acquired learning in Arabia, Persia, Iraq and other places, and then had come to settle down in Jaunpur. Usually a group of students had centered round

such men, and thus had sprung up groups of satellites round prominent intellectual luminaries. The Jaunpuri culture was, therefore, only a branch—although a very important branch—of the general Muslim culture of India.

The point of difference : The Purity of Jaunpuri Culture. The Jaunpuri culture, however, differed in one important respect from the general culture of the Indian Muslims. The Muslim culture in India had been gradually acquiring a native Indian or Hindu colour in the great capitals of Delhi, Agra and Lahore, where it had come into very close contact with the native civilisation. This Indianisation had been precipitated in the reign of Akbar who got Sanskrit books translated into Persian. Dara Shikoh became so much interested in Sanskrit books of the Hindus that he translated the *Upanishads* into Persian, and in the preface of the translation went so far as to say that it compared favourably with the Quran. The Jaunpuri learning had been free from this influence, and had kept itself pure. The native Hindu population of Jaunpur was too ignorant to shed any intellectual influence, and on the other hand the scholars of Jaunpur kept constant intercourse with Arabia, Persia and Iraq. The Jaunpuri learning may be compared to that of a university where foreign scholars impart education and keep themselves in touch with the newer developments in foreign learning. During the closing days of the Mughal

Ēmpire, Jaunpuri learning had become more allied to the general learning of the Muslim countries than to the Indianised Muslim culture which had sprung up in Delhi and other places. We might say that the Jaunpuri culture was purer and less alloyed with the Hindu admixture.*

No Independent School of Jaunpuri Learning.

Unfortunately the scholars of Jaunpur did not develop an independent school based on the learning of Muslim countries. In Spain, Muslims had given rise to a powerful intellectual movement based on the classical books written by their predecessors, and had produced thinkers like Averoes and historians like Ibn Khaldun. The Fatimids of Egypt, although their power was short-lived, had also encouraged the development of an independent school.

Reasons : (a) Jaunpur Not a Political Unit.

It seems that Jaunpur could not develop like Spain and Egypt for three main reasons among others. The Moors and the Fatimids had their own rulers with peace, prosperity and a political unity which always have their counterpart in intellectual integrity and development. The scholars of Jaunpur, on the other hand, lived under no political unit and were not encouraged by any power.

*Sultan Husain Shah of Jaunpur, however, is said to be the founder of the cult of *Satyapir*, which is a synthesis of Hinduism and Islam. The cult still exists in Jaunpur.

True, they sometimes were granted *Jagirs* by the Delhi government; but that hardly amounted to patronage of learning. It was more a source of livelihood to the individual scholar than an encouragement to scholarship in general. During the days of the short-lived Sharqi Kingdom, no doubt, there had been given an impetus to scholarship as such and all arts and sciences had been patronised; and had the Sharqi Kingdom been spared by the ruthless Bahlol Lodi probably things would have taken a different turn. Since the downfall of the Sharqi Kingdom, Jaunpur never became the capital of any ruler for any length of time, and from the time of Akbar it even ceased to be the capital of a province.

(b) *The Saintliness of Scholars* The scholars who remained at Jaunpur were saintly in their natures, and hence they cared more for a way of life and practical observances than for a dispassionate and persistent enquiry after scientific truths. Their aim was hardly the pursuit of theoretical knowledge as such, and hence they could not be the founders of new lines of intellectual development.

(c) *The Decadence of Muslim Culture.* The third reason for the lack of intellectual originality at Jaunpur must be sought in the general state of the Muslim culture of the age. Even before the establishment of the Sharqi Kingdom at Jaunpur, Baghdad had been sacked by the Mongols; and with the fall of Baghdad Muslim culture had

suffered a serious setback. After the downfall of the Abbaside Kingdom, the Muslim countries cannot be said to have enjoyed political freedom for centuries. Now human culture is a tender plant which flourishes only in political and economic peace and prosperity, and hence the growth of Muslim learning was marred. Baghdad had very early replaced Mecca and Basra as the centre of Muslim culture; and during the few centuries of the Abbaside rule much original work had been carried on there. With the appearance of turmoil in Baghdad the very fountain-head of Muslim culture was choked, its very backbone cracked and signs of decline and decadence appeared. Moreover, the brief period of Muslim activities in acquiring knowledge had been a period of phenomenal creativeness, and in less than a century they had excelled all nations in almost all sciences. According to the general law of development of civilisation, a period of acute and profuse creativeness is often followed by an era of mental stagnation. Darwin and other naturalists have expressed surprise at the fact that sometimes numerous mighty minds appear in the same nation within a century, and at other times no first grade intellect is born for centuries. The history of Greek civilisation gives us a good instance of this. The age from Socrates to Aristotle was an age of great men in Greece; but after the death of Aristotle and the downfall of Athens creative minds ceased to be born in Greece. Something of the

same kind happened to the Muslims. After the Abbaside era, and the break-up of their mighty empire, the Muslim nation ceased to produce master-minds, and subsequent scholars took to erudition and elucidation rather than original research just like the post-Aristotelians of Greece. The scholars of Jaunpur were the students of this learning which was at its ebb. As a result they busied themselves more with erudition and learned exposition than with original creative work. The creative spirit of the Muslims had vanished even in their native lands, and the Jaunpuri scholars could be hardly expected to catch it. With a few exceptions, it is hardly possible to point out from a mass of literature any work of these scholars which may be said to have substantially made an original addition to knowledge. This was, however, not their fault, for they were the products of the mediaeval age when the whole world had somehow lost creative spirit. They can hardly claim to have unveiled reality and truth any further than had already been done before them. It is due to this that most of their books have lost their value and have perished with the lapse of time. In their days, however, they were justly respected as great savants of learning and eminent scholars. Mullah Mahmood was probably the greatest of the scholars of Jaunpur who flourished during the reign of Shahjahan.

Chapter II.

Mullah Mahmood—the Man and His Work.

Sources.

There is practically a dearth of material for a full biography of Mullah Mahmood. It is strange that a scholar who, as we shall see, enjoyed so much respect at the royal court of Shahjahan should find so little space in the histories of the time. The sources from which the account of his life and family has been given in this book may be classified as follows:—

- (a) Family Papers preserved with Mullah Mahmood's illustrious descendant, the Hon'ble Dr. Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court. Some of these are very antiquated records of genealogy and biography, and they form by far the most important material.
- (b) The Histories of the time of Shahjahan. Very scanty notices are found in *Shahjahannama*, and *Badshahnama*. *Amal-i-Salih* of Mullah Salih, however, contains a fuller account and much original matter.

(c) The Biographies of literary men, which Muslims have always been very fond of writing. Of these the following deserve special mention :—

- (1) *Al Adab al Baqia wal Abhas al Baqia*—By Mullah Abd-al-Baqi, a disciple of Mullah Mahmood. In the preface of this book the loving pupil gives an account of his teacher and praises him. The material is original, first-hand information, and the praise is just.
- (2) *Subh-i-Sadiq*—By Mirza Muhammad Sadiq, another disciple of Mullah Mahmood, who was the Qadhi of Bengal in the reign of Shahjahan. This book also contains original matter.
- (3) *Sheer-o-Shakar*—A book of history, written by a grandfather of Mullah Mahmood, Haji Abul Khair, who has written an account of his family at the end of the book. Certain portions of this book are the possession of the Hon'ble Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman.
- (4) *Kitab-al-Faidhan*—By Maulavi Ahmad Mukarram, of which a summary is preserved with the Hon'ble Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman. This book and *Sheer-o-Shakar* supply valuable original material for the genealogy and family history of Mullah Mahmood.
- (5) *Tadhkira Ghausia*—It gives accounts of certain members of Mullah Mahmood's family.
- (6) *Sabhat-al-Marjan*—By Azad Bilgrami. It gives a good account, and is very valuable as giving facts taken from *Subh-i-Sadiq*.


Azad Bilgrami has also written *Maasir-al-Kiram* in Persian and *Tadhkira-i-Ulema* in Urdu, which are brief summaries of *Sabhat-al-Marjan*.

- (7) *Tajalli-i-Noor*, alias *Tadhkira-i-Mashaheer-i-Jaunpur*, the second part of *Jaunpurnama*, by Maulavi Noor-al-Deen. The book is reliable, but the account of Mullah Mahmood's life is based on *Kitab-al-Faidhan*, *Tadhkira-Ghausia*, *Wafiat-al-A'lam*, *Ganj-i-Rashidi*, and *Sabhat-al-Marjan*; and hence as an original source the book has no value.
 - (8) The biography of Mullah Mahmood—By Maulavi Abdul Hai of Lucknow at the end of the edition of Mullah Mahmood's *Al Shams-al-Bazigha*. It is practically a quotation from *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, and additions and differences are uncritical materials and mistakes.
 - (9) *Tadhkira-i-Ulema-i-Hind*—By Rahman Ali. This is a valuable book and is based on critical research.
 - (10) *Qamoos-al-Mashaheer*—By Nizami of Budoun. It is a very brief summary in Urdu of the accounts given by Azad Bilgrami and Noor-al-Deen, and is of little value.
- (d) Certain facts about the life of Mullah Mahmood can also be deduced from statements in his philosophical books.


The Life of Mullah Mahmood.

Ancestry. Mullah Mahmood was descended from Caliph Umar on the father's side and the Persian King Yezdgurd on the mother's side. Both

Aryan and Semitic blood thus flew into his veins.
His genealogical tree is as follows :



*Haji Abul Khair writes in *Sheer-o-Shakar* "امام اسحق بن ناصرالدین امام سالم". The author of *Tadhkira Ghausia*, however, brings in the name of Ibraheem between Imam Is'haq and Imam Salim. The account of *Tadhkira Ghausia* has been accepted because it agrees with other books of history.



†Sultan Sulaiman Shah is not mentioned in *Kitab-al-Faidhan*; but the following phrase occurs in *Sheer-o-Shakar*:

ابن ابوالنوارس موبدالدين سلطان سليمان شاه بن لغمان
 "شاه ابن مظفرالدين سلطان احمد فرخ شاه"

*From the Family Papers and the *Kitab-al-Faidhan* it appears that Shah Muhammad alias Shaikh Barhe was the Father and not the grandfather of Mullah Mahmood, and hence they leave out the name of Shaikh Muhammad. Azad Bilgrami has given the name of

The family, as will be seen from the genealogy, originally belonged to Mecca or Medina; but it must have migrated like many other families to Basra and Baghdad when the capital of Muslim culture and kingdom was transferred to those places. It is hardly possible to trace the name of the actual member who migrated. It is learnt, however, that the eleventh descendant of Caliph Umar, Sultan Ahmad Farrukh Shah, had left Medina far back and reached Afghanistan, where he was crowned King of Kabul. His unfortunate grandson, Sultan Sulaiman Shah, however, had to face the Mongol invaders and was himself killed by Chengiz Khan

Mullah Mahmood's grandfather as Shaikh Shah Muhammad in *Sabhat-al-Marjan* (Bombay 1303 A. H., page 53), and as Shah Muhammad in *Tadhkira-i-Ulema* (Lahore, page 34), and all later biographers have followed him. Unfortunately Azad does not give the name of Mullah Mahmood's father. The author of *Jaunpurnama* is silent on this point. Rahman Ali, in his *Tadhkira-i-Ulema-i-Hind*, gives both the names of the father and grandfather, and writes :

“ملا محمود جونپوری ابن شیخ محمد بن شاہ محمد فاروقی” (Lucknow 1894, page 221). This makes the whole thing clear. The name of the father and the son both being ‘Muhammad’, which was not unusual in the olden times, the words ‘Shah’ and ‘Shaikh’ have been interchanged and given rise to ambiguity. The surname of ‘Shaikh Barhe’ (Shaikh Senior) also points out to the fact that there was a ‘Shaikh Junior’ who must have been the father of Mullah Mahmood.

Halaku in 610 A. H., in the vicinity of Kabul. His infant son Azd-al-Deen Muhammad, was saved by the loving nurse. The son was joined by his mother, and the small family migrated to Delhi in the reign of Alauddin Khilji (1295-1316 A.D.) The Sultan welcomed the fugitive royal family and bestowed on them some villages as *Jagir*. Sultan Taj-al-Deen Muhammad, the son of Azd-al-Deen Mohammad became a noble of the Delhi court. His son, Sultan Gayas-al-Deen Muhammad, was a great scholar, who renounced worldly honour, gave up the title of Sultan, and became a saint. His descendants were scholars and saints, and were called '*Makhdooms*' and '*Shahs*' (spiritual lords and kings). The family again witnessed the terrorism of the Mongols, and Timurlane plundered Delhi (1398 A. D.) in the time of Makhdoom Shaikh Muhammad, the grandson of Sultan Gayas-al-Deen Muhammad. The saint Makhdoom Shaikh Muhammad left the turmoils of Delhi and migrated to Jaunpur in the time of the Sharqi Kings. Sultan Husain Shah Sharqi, the great patron of scholars and saints, bestowed a *Jagir* of twelve villages on Makhdoom's son, Shaikh Musshayyad. But no interest in worldly objects had apparently been left for the saints, and Shaikh Musshayyad's grandson, Shaikh Muhammad Ma'roof II, tired of managing his *Jagir*, left the city of Jaunpur and migrated to a suburban countryside which took from the saint the name of 'Walipur' (saint's place). The

name was subsequently corrupted into 'Walidpur', a village which still flourishes*. Shaikh Muhammad Ma'roof's grave is still present in Walidpur and is known as the 'Shrine of Shah Wali'. The grandson of Shaikh Muhammad Ma'roof II, Haji Abul Khair, found even the bustle of a small village too distracting for his intellectual pursuits. So he left Walidpur and built a small cottage on the bank of the river *Tons*, about a furlong distant from the village. The place was called *Bahar* (outside). The name of the small habitation that sprang up on the spot was corrupted into *Bahira*, now-a-days pronounced as *Bhira*. Haji Abul Khair was the author of the book entitled *Sheer-o-Shakar*, from which much about the family can be learnt. He was welcomed by the court of Shahjahan; but the saint that he was, he declined to accept the royal present. Another grandson of Shaikh Muhammad Ma'roof II, Shah Muhammad, alias Shaikh Barhe, was the grandfather of Mullah Mahmood.

Date of Birth. Mullah Mahmood was born at Walidpur in Azamgarh district. There is some difficulty in fixing the actual year of his birth. The Biographies and the Family Papers are silent on the point. In *Jaunpurnama*† the date of his birth is

*The village is situated at present in the district of Azamgarh, in sub-division Muhammadabad, about 51 miles to the north-east of Jaunpur.

†*Jaunpurnama* by Saiyid Noor-al-Deen, Jaunpur: 1900, Vol. II, p. 48.

given as 993 A. H. Nizami Budauni also gives the same date in *Qamoos-al-Mashaheer*, and also gives the corresponding date 1585 A. D.* It is not possible, however, to accept this date for various considerations. Firstly, the statements in the *Jaunpurnama* are contradictory. On page 49, the author writes that Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal was the teacher of Mullah Mahmood, on page 44 that Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal was born on the 17th of Ramdhan, 997 A. H., and then we are told that Mullah Mahmood finished study at the age of seventeen. These statements, if taken true, give the conclusion that Mullah Mahmood acquired all prevalent knowledge from a teacher who was only thirteen years old when Mullah Mahmood completed his studies, which is absurd. Secondly, we learn from Azad Bilgrami† and Rahman Ali‡ that Mullah Mahmood was at first the disciple of his grandfather, Shaikh Shah Muhammad, and after his death he went to Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal. Shaikh Shah Muhammad,

* *Qamoos-al-Mashaheer*, Budaun: 1926 Vol. II, p. 206.

The author of this book follows all the mistakes of *Jaunpurnama* and adds a few other mistakes in his account of Mullah Mahmood. Hence the book is neither trustworthy, nor original, and no importance should be attached to it.

† *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Bombay 1303 A. H., p. 53.

‡ *Tadhkira* by Rahman Ali, Lucknow 1894, p. 221 and p. 84.

however, died in 1032 A. H.* and if we take 993 A. H. as the year of Mullah Mahmood's birth, he would be thirtynine years of age at the time of his grandfather's death, which is highly incompatible with the fact that he completed his study at the age of seventeen. Thirdly, there is a reliable tradition among his descendants and the elders of Jaunpur that his life was less than forty years; and the year of his death being known with certainty to be 1062 A. H.,† we cannot take 993 A. H. as the year of his birth, which would give him a life of sixty-nine years. The above tradition is supported by the statement of Mullah Mahmood himself in the preface to his *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, where he says that death did not spare him to write his book on Metaphysics which he had already planned. It seems advisable, therefore, to fix the year of his birth as 1023 A. H., which would mean that he was about thirtynine years of age when he died in 1062 A. H., and was a boy of nine years when his

* *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Ibid, p. 53; and *Tadhkira*, Ibid, p. 84.

† This is the date of his death which all historians and biographers give. Azad also quotes (*Ma'asira-al-Kiram*, Agra, 1920, p. 203) the actual hemistich expressing the date of death, which is, *محمود و افضل بگو آه آه*. Preserving dates in hemistichs has been an old custom in Oriental literature, and whenever we can find out a hemistich composed by a contemporary, we must rest assured that in it the date has reached us without any alteration.

grandfather died and he went to Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal, who was then thirty-five years of age. The name of Mullah Mahmood, however, has been given in the list of "the trusted scholars of Jahangir" by the editor and partial author of *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Muhammad Hadi, in the preface to that book.* Jahangir died in 1036 A. H.; and so, if Mullah Mahmood was born in 1023 A. H., he could be only thirteen years of age at the time of Jahangir's death. Surely a lad of thirteen or less could not be a trusted scholar of the Great Mughal's court. This difficulty, however, does not seem to call for a change in the date which we have accepted. No other historian or biographer mentions Mullah Mahmood as having gone to the court of Jahangir; and his name is not mentioned even in the body of *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, like the names of other scholars of the court. Even Mullah Muhammad Sadiq does not mention Mullah Mahmood's interview with Jahangir, but only says that shortly after finishing his education Mullah Mahmood went to Akbarabad to the court of Shahjahan.† It would thus appear that Muhammad Hadi erroneously included Mullah Mahmood, a scholar of the court of Shahjahan, into the list of the scholars of Jahangir's court. The mistake seems to be due to some oversight. We can,

* *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, edited by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Aligarh, 1864, preface p. 19.

† *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Bombay 1303, p. 53.

therefore, safely say that Mullah Mahmood was born probably in or about 1023 A.H., a date which has the least chance of mistake.

Education and Study. A few years after his birth, Mullah Mahmood came from Walidpur to Jaunpur. Here he began to study under his grandfather, Shaikh Shah Muhammad, "one of the greatest scholars of Jaunpur, and a pious and God-fearing man who died in 1032 A. H."* Mullah Mahmood next became the student of Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal.† This new teacher was the son of Mufti Shaikh Hamza, a descendant of Caliph Othman, who had migrated to India from the city of Damavand in the vicinity of Mazindran, and had settled in the congenial climate of Rudauli (District Barabanki, Oudh), where he was appointed a *Mufti* (Judge). Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal was born at Rudauli on the 16th of Ramdhan, 997 A.H.,‡ and subsequently came to Jaunpur. He was, according to Rahman Ali§ "the greatest scholar of his time and the most learned of his age, well-versed in all intellectual and traditional sciences, religious, pious,

* *Tadhkira* by Rahman Ali, Lucknow 1894, p. 84.

† He should be distinguished from Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal of Allahabad, another scholar (born at village Saiyidpur, district Ghazipur), who wrote commentaries on *Fusoos-al-Hikam*, *Mathnavi Maulana Room*, etc. His biography is given in *Tadhkira*, Ibid, p. 181.

‡ *Jaunpurnama*, Vol. II, Jaunpur 1910, p. 44.

§ *Tadhkira*, Ibid, p. 181.

‘good-mannered and mild-tempered, who spent his valuable time in the service of learning and study’. He observed celibacy, and did not marry at all,* Mullah Mahmood, his best-beloved disciple, was very intelligent and diligent, who learnt the whole Quran by heart at the age of thirteen and completed the study of all traditional and intellectual sciences while he was still a boy of seventeen years.†

Journey to Akbarabad. Having completed his studies, Mullah Mahmood went to the court of the Great Mughal at Akbarabad, and became intimate with Asif Khan of the court of Shahjahan.‡ The Emperor himself honoured him, and he acquired much prestige in the court. Muhammad Sadiq, a disciple of Mullah Mahmood, has written in his book *Subh-i-Sadiq* that he met the scholar at Akbarabad.§ Mullah Mahmood probably stayed at the court for some time, and Shah Shuja, Shahjahan's son, became his student. In 1042 A.H. he presented his great book, *Al Faraid*, to the Amir al Umara Shayista Khan.|| He returned to Jaunpur soon afterwards, and began teaching different sciences in a mosque and *khanqah* in Muhallah Shaikh Mahamid at Jaunpur. Some generations after Mullah Mahmood's death, the *khanqah* and the mosque devolved


* *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Bombay 1303 A. H., p. 53.

† *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Ibid, p. 53, and *Tadhkira*, Ibid, 219, etc.

‡ *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Ibid.

§ *Sabhat-al-Marjan*, Ibid.

|| *Ma'asir-al-Kiram*, by Azad Bilgrami, Agra 1910, p. 203.



The Gateway of Mullah Mahmood.

on Hafiz Abid Husain*, Vakil, a descendant of Mullah Mahmood. The convent was used by him as his house, and he built another mosque in place of the old one which had crumbled down. The gate of Mullah Mahmood's time still exists in Jaunpur, though it has been patched and repaired from time to time†. Mullah Mahmood was so young when he began teaching advanced students that, according to a reliable tradition in the family, he used to leave his students and climb up the gate to catch young ones of sparrows which nestled there. This action of Mullah Mahmood proves, moreover, that he did not care to assume an air of importance or undue seriousness even before his students, which is a rare instance of frankness and simplicity.

Pilgrimage to Mecca: Interview with Mir Baqir Damad. After sometime, Mullah Mahmood left Jaunpur for Mecca on Hadj pilgrimage by the land route through Persia and Iraq. We do not know any details of this journey, excepting a solitary tradition in the family that in Persia Mullah Mahmood secretly attended the lectures of Mir Baqir Damad, a great scholar and the famous teacher of Mullah

* K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin, in his book *Sharqi Monuments of Jaunpur*, wrongly describes Hafiz Abid Husain as *Mufti* Abid Husain. This is wrong, and the two names belong to two distinct individuals.

† A photo of the gate, as it now stands, is given in the beginning of the book.

Sadr-al-Deen of Shiraz. Differences arose between the two, most probably on the philosophical Problem of Time after two or three days, and the identity of Mullah Mahmood was discovered. There is nothing in this tradition which can be disbelieved, for it was but natural for Mullah Mahmood to attend the lectures of Mir Baqir Damad, the most famous philosopher of the day, while he was passing through Persia, and in *Al Shams Al Bazigha* Mullah Mahmood has devoted many pages to a detailed criticism of Mir Baqir Damad's theories about Time. We must rest assured, however, that inspite of his differences, Mullah Mahmood had been very highly impressed by Mir Baqir Damad, and had the greatest reverence for him, as is proved by the serious, highflown, laudatory phrases in which he invariably mentions Mir Baqir Damad's name. Even in the final expression of his criticisms, he says that he cannot agree with the 'expert, deep, noble, Saiyid scholar' for whom he has 'full faith and belief that he holds a high place in philosophy, has a thorough insight into the fundamental principles of First Philosophy (Metaphysics), and has repaired the loop-holes and corrected the mistakes of most of the principles of high science (Metaphysics)*'. This is a typical sentence, and similar sentences can be multiplied from *Al Shams Al Bazigha*. We must praise Mullah Mahmood's tolerance as well as his love for truth.

**Al Shams Al Bazigha*, Lucknow, 1288 A. H., p. 137.

Project to Build an Observatory. Mullah Mahmood returned to Jaunpur after performing Hadj, and acquiring fresh learning from Muslim countries. He seems to have gone again to Akbarabad, where he persuaded Shahjahan to build an observatory. The minister, however, opposed him, and told the king that operations in Balkh had to be conducted in the near future, and hence it was inadvisable to spend money at the time. The observatory was never built, and India suffered a permanent loss; for Mullah Mahmood was the right man, and an observatory built by him and financed by the great royal builder, Shahjahan, would have given a permanent impetus to the study of Astronomy in India. The plot of ground, which Mullah Mahmood had selected for building the observatory, was afterwards known to be one which another scholar had selected previously, and this proves his judicious choice and sound judgment*.

Sickness and Death. He returned to Jaunpur and began teaching and writing books. The great scholar that he was, and possessing, as he did, encyclopaedic learning, he planned books on all subjects. Death, however, did not spare him to finish the labour of his love, and while still busy with his book on Physics, *Al Shams Al Bazigho*, "the drum of departure",

**Maasir-al-Kiram* by Azad Bilgrami, Agra 1910, p. 202.

as he himself describes it, "was beaten for him". He died on the 9th of Rabi-al-Awwal, 1062 A. H.* His loving teacher, Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal, was still alive. The death of his beloved illustrious disciple broke him down, for forty days he did not smile, and on the fortieth day he followed his beloved disciple to the grave. Somebody composed the following date-hemistich :

”محمود و افضل بگو آه آه“.

His Grave.—Mullah Mahmood was buried in Muhallah Sipah of Jaunpur, and his grave still exists.† Maulavi Noor-al-Deen published in March, 1900 a wrong statement as to the identity of this grave in his *Jaunpurnama*, and the mistake has since been adopted by two uncritical writers. "Mullah Mahmood was buried", writes the author of *Jaunpurnama*, "in Muhallah Chachakpur, Jaunpur city".‡ K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin simply translated into English this statement in his *Sharqi Monuments of Jaunpur*, adding that the grave is surrounded by

* *Sabhat-al-Marjan* by Azad Bilgrami; Bombay: 1303 A. H. p. 53. Also *Jaunpurnama*, Jaunpur: 1900, Vol. II, p. 48.

† A Photo of the grave is given in the beginning of this book.

‡ *Jaunpurnama*, Vol. II, Jaunpur: 1900, p. 49. As a matter of fact, the statement in the *Jaunpurnama* is the only independent statement, and the other two statements of K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin and Nizami Budauni are neither original nor independent.



The Grave of Mullah Mahmood.

an enclosure and that the private house of Mullah Mahmood lies in ruins close by the grave. Nizami Budauni, has faithfully translated this version into Urdu without taking the least trouble to examine its authenticity. It is unfortunate that a simple fact was misunderstood by the author of *Jaunpurnama*, and it is more to be regretted that K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin did not correct this mistake, which he was best in a position to do while writing his book.* As far as *Qamoos-al-Mashaheer* of Nizami Budauni is concerned, the whole of that book is unreliable, untrustworthy and uncritical, and is full of blunders of different kinds. The question, therefore, calls for some discussion so that the mistake may be corrected once for all.

The so-called grave of Mullah Mahmood, in Chachakpur, mentioned by the above three writers, is situated just below the Allahabad-Jaunpur Railway line, between Zafarabad and Jaunpur stations, close to the Railway Bridge on river Gomti, at the telegraph post No. 44/18, close to the Railway Cabin No. 42/c†. It is surrounded by a low massive enclosure. At a little distance there are ruins of an old brick house and close by there is a well. This however, is not the grave of Mullah Mahmood, but of one Sultan Mahmood or Shah Mahmood.

* K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin, as a matter of fact, was the District Officer in Jaunpur when he wrote his book, and hence no one could be expected to have better resources than he.

† Written in December, 1933.

“ In the Sipah *Muhallah* ”, writes Mr. H. R. Nevill,* “ is the tomb of a celebrated Arabic Scholar and Physician,† named Mullah Mahmood, who frequented the court of Shahjahan ”. The author of *Jaunpurnama* did not know English ; but it is strange how K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin overlooked this clear statement in the *Gazetteer*. But more authentic than the *Gazetteer*, or any other book, is a letter of Hafiz Abid Husain, whose statements as to the grave of the elders of his family can never be challenged. The original letter in the handwriting of Hafiz Abid Husain is preserved with the Hon'ble Dr. Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, and is as old as 1887 A.D. It reads as follows : “ My beloved son, Muhammad Abdul Hakeem fell ill on 11th May, 1887..... He died on the night of the 30th of May, 1887.....On 30th of May, 1887, after sunrise, he was buried in the grave-yard of Mullah Mahmood, situated in Muhallah Mittupura within the enclosure, on the eastern side, practically in the lap of my revered father, Maulavi Shah Muhammad Musa, whose grave is adjacent

* *District Gazetteers of the United Provinces*, Vol. XXVIII, Jaunpur: p. 90.

† Mullah Mahmood was not a physician, although he was a great physicist. In common Urdu, the word ‘*Hakeem*’, which means ‘philosopher’ is usually used for physicians, because in olden times Unani physicians were usually philosophers. Mr. Nevill seems to have misunderstood the word ‘*Hakeem*’, and hence this mistake.

to the eastern wall of the enclosure. These two graves of the grandson and the grandfather are parallel.....".* The enclosure referred to in this letter still exists in Muhallah Sipah, in the sub-quarter of Billochtola, which is the new name of Mittupura. The grave of Muhammad Abdul Hakeem is still extant, and bears an inscription. In the middle of this enclosure is the grave of Mullah Mahmood. The elders of Jaunpur say that Mullah Mahmood's grave also bore an inscription, but the stone has now fallen down. The southern boundary of the enclosure is also in ruins.

In face of the above facts and evidences it must be accepted that the grave of Mullah Mahmood does not lie in Muhallah Chachakpur, but

* The actual Urdu version of the letter is as follows:—

تاریخ گیارہویں مئی ۱۸۸۷ عیسوی روز چہارشنبہ لکھت
جگرم محمد عبدالکھوم رحمۃ اللہ تعالیٰ العالی الکریم وھوارحم
الراحمون بعلائت تپ مہلا ھو کر..... آتہ بیجے عین وقت
عشاء شب سی ام ۱۸۸۷ عیسوی..... راھی جوار رحمت
الہی ھوئے

.....
۳۰ مئی ۱۸۸۷ عیسوی بعد اشراق بہ قبرستان ملا متھون
صاحب واقع متھوپورہ اندر چہار دیواری جناب پورب مہرے وانہ
بزرگوار حضرت شاہ مواری محمد مرصی صاحب مرحوم و مغفور
کی قبر شریف کے جو متصل چہار دیواری شرقی ھے پیچھم
جانب گویا گود مہن اونکے مدفون ھوئے - ۲۰ دونوں قبرین دادا
و پوتا کی برابر ھیں پورب مہرے والد کی اور پیچھم عزیز
سورھف کی
راقم عاصی محمد عبد اللہ عرف عابد حسین وکھل غفر اللہ لہ -

is situated in the sub-quarter Bilochkola of Muhallah Sipah. As a matter of fact, the grave is quite famous and is fully known and identified by the old residents of Jaunpur. Had it not been for a fear of a wrong statement being published, we would not have indulged in this detailed discussion and examination of evidences. It is expected that in future no controversy will arise in respect of the identity of this grave, and the uncritical statements to be found in *Jaunpurnama*, and the books of K. B. Maulavi Fasihuddin and Nizami Budauni, will be disregarded.

Character. The lack of material for a detailed biography of Mullah Mahmood makes it quite unsafe to dogmatise about his character; but we have to make full use of the material at our disposal, and to form an opinion by examining closely his books and the few facts of his life which have come down to us. To all appearances he inherited to the full the noble qualities of his forefathers. He was sagacious, wise, judicious and intelligent, with a deep insight into subtleties and a quick grasp of problems. In his statements, he was precise, moderate, and decisive. He was good-natured, and light-hearted: he could catch sparrows and play the trick of secretly attending the lectures of Mir Baqir Damad. But at the same time he was very serious and thoughtful; for it is related of him that he never uttered a word which he had to correct subsequently; and if he sometimes found himself unable to give a

reply, he used to say that he was absent-minded at the moment*. This also proves that he was scrupulously truthful, had a keen sense of responsibility, and was very frank, humble and simple. Apparently he cared little for this world and its pleasures, and inherited to a great extent the saintliness of his forefathers, as is proved by the fact that he preferred Jaunpur to the court of the Great Mughal. There seems to have been a tinge of asceticism also in him; for to all appearances he did not marry and lived a bachelor for life like his teacher. His writings prove that he possessed emotions to the full. His high literary attainments bear witness to his aesthetic taste; and his small essay on 'Women', in which he has composed poems for different classes of females, shows that he was not foreign to delicate instincts.


Religion. His journey to Mecca for performing Hadj may lead one to believe that he was pious and religious. That he was a moral man and feared God may be taken as certain; but one should seriously doubt how far he really believed in minute details of the Muslim faith. In his writings, wherever his philosophical principles are brought into conflict with tenets of Muslim belief, he invariably decides in favour of philosophy. In *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, he sides with the materialists in maintaining that time is eternal; and in *Determinism and*

* *Sabhat-al-Marjan* by Azad Bilgrami, Bombay 1303 A. H., p. 53.

Freewill he rejects the orthodox view of determinism to which as a devout Hanafite Muslim he was expected to subscribe. There are many passages in *Al Shams Al Bazigha* and other books where he seems to be doubtful about certain tenets of belief. His usual way seems to be not to deny tenets of belief flatly but to argue against them silently if they seemed doubtful or wrong. This he did probably because he did not want to incur the wrath of the orthodox theologians; but, being a philosopher and a seeker after truth, he could not manage to sacrifice the dictates of his reason at the altar of pious submissive belief. Unfortunately his booklet, *Matnun Mateen*, written specially on Dogmatics, is not extant; but even without it we can be sure that he was not an orthodox Muslim in the common and strict sense of the term. He was a man of broad, free views, and cared more for rational truths than for dogmas. Nevertheless he must have been regular in all religious observances.

Mullah Mahmood's Progeny. The family of Mullah Mahmood flourished in Jaunpur and the later genealogy is as follows. It is advisable to begin with Shaikh Muhammad Ma'roof II of Walidpur, so that the genealogy given previously may get connected.

Shaikh Muhammad Ma'roof II



The records and traditions do not tell that Mullah Mahmood had any son or daughter. We have seen that his teacher Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal did not marry and observed celibacy, It is very likely, therefore, that his disciple Mullah Mahmood also followed the example of his beloved teacher, and lived a bachelor. There is, however, a family in Jaunpur which claims direct descent from Mullah Mahmood, but the claim has not been substantiated and does not bear scrutiny.* Mullah

*A letter sent to this family asking them if they had any documents or records of the family of Mullah Mahmood, brought the reply that they possessed none.

‘ Mahmood brought up and educated as his own son the son of his sister by Maulavi Shaikh Muhammad Khidhr. His name was Mullah Abd-al-Sattar, and he inherited the *khangah* and the mosque of Mullah Mahmood. The fifth descendant of Mullah Abd-al-Sattar was Hafiz Abid Husain, a leading Vakil of Jaunpur, who has written the foreword to the *Determinism and Freewill* of Mullah Mahmood. This foreword has been translated in the present book. Hafiz Abid Husain married his daughter to the late Maulavi Shah Muhammad Uthman, a great lawyer, and a direct descendant of Shaikh Muhammad Ma’roof II and Haji Abul Khair, the author of *Sheer-o-Shakar*. The two chief branches of the illustrious family thus met in the son of Maulavi Shah Muhammad Uthman, the Hon’ble Dr. Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, the distinguished Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, who is in possession of the manuscript of *Determinism and Freewill* and the Family Papers of Mullah Mahmood. Those who have the honour of coming in touch with him know only too well how beautifully he combines the family legacies of aristocracy, highmindedness and nobleness, with scholarship, religiousness and simplicity.

The Works of Mullah Mahmood.

Learning and Scholarship. Mullah Mahmood was one of the greatest scholars not only of his time or of Jaunpur but of India as a whole. "Undoubtedly there has not been one in India," writes Azad Bilgrami,* "like the two Farooqi Shaikhs, one of them in Sufism, Maulana Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi, already mentioned, and the other in philosophical and literary sciences, Mullah Mahmood". Mullah Mahmood had studied all the philosophical and literary sciences, and possessed a good knowledge of the doctrines of religion and Sufism. He had special interest in philosophy, literature, mathematics and astronomy—a rare and unusual combination of tastes. His books, which he unfortunately could not write as many as he had planned, bear witness to the fact that he had not limited his studies to the current curriculum of the *Madrasahs*, but had widely and dispassionately studied outside books.† He seems to have had a passionate desire for books; for we find in his writings quotations from books which were no longer studied by common scholars in his time. His every sentence is

* Sabhat-al-Marjan, Bombay 1303 A. H., P. 53.

"لازيم انكلم يظهر بالهند مثل الفاروقين احدهما فى علم الحقايق وهو مولانا الشيخ احمد السرهندى المتقدم ذكره والثانى فى العلوم الحكيمه والادبيه وهو الملا مسمود"

† Some of his philosophical books go to show that he had studied Indian Philosophy also.

a proof of wide reading, dispassionate judgment, acute thinking and broad outlook. His books on literature and philosophy bear testimony to his masterly control over those sciences ; and the fact that he wanted to build an observatory, if patronised by Shahjahan, shows that he was equally well-versed in mathematics and astronomy. Moreover, we learn from Mullah Salih that he was a great mathematician and astronomer, and in *Amal-i-Salih* his name appears in the list of mathematicians and astronomers of the court of Shahjahan. He spent his days in study and teaching ; and, besides the scholars of his family, left behind him a circle of students who were great scholars in their times.

Disciples. Unfortunately a full list of his spiritual sons is not available, but we can glean from the pages of literary biographies a few names. One was Mullah Abd-al-Sattar, the son of Mullah Mahmood's sister. The other was Mullah Muhammad Sadiq,* the author of *Subh-i-Sadiq*, who became the Qadhi of Bengal in the reign of Shahjahan. The third was Shah Shuja,† the son of Emperor Shahjahan. The best of these students, however, seems to have been Mullah Abd-al-Baqi,‡ the author of *Al Adab Al Baqia wal Abbas Al Baqia*. He was attracted by

**Sabhat-al-Marjan* by Azad Bilgrami, Bombay 1303 A. H., p. 53.

† *Ma'asir-al-Kiram* by Azad Bilgrami, Agra 1910, p. 203.

‡ *Tadhkira* by Rahman Ali, Lucknow 1894, p. 368.

the great fame of Mullah Mahmood and came from Bengal to sit at his feet. After the death of Mullah Mahmood, the disciple lived in Jaunpur and spent his days in teaching and study. Once he went to Delhi and was offered a scholarship of Rs. 900 per month by the Emperor Aurangzib; but he had learnt from his teacher to disregard worldly riches and so he returned to Jaunpur. In the preface of his book named above, he has justly praised his master, and the expressions demonstrate how dearly he loved Mullah Mahmood.

Bent of Mind and School of Thought. Before giving an account of the writings of Mullah Mahmood, it seems desirable to examine the general characteristics of his way of thinking, and find out what was the particular bent of learning and the school of thought which he followed. This would help to give us a general insight into his writings and enable us to understand them better.

The Two Schools of Muslim Learning. Two schools of scholarship can be distinguished in Muslim learning in general*. One was the Baghdad school. Early in the history of Muslim culture, the centre of Muslim learning had been transferred from Medina to Basra and Baghdad, which had been made the political capital and, therefore, had become the intellectual centre of Muslims. In these

* For a fuller account and full discussion of the subject, the inquisitive reader is referred to the writer's *History of Islamic Philosophy*.

places religious sciences had been studied previous to the philosophical. The scholars had begun with the study of the Quran, the Traditions, and Arabic history and literature, collectively known as *Al Uloom Al Islamia* ; and it was only later on, after translations from the Greek language had been made by the orders of the Abbaside court, that they began the study of theoretical and natural sciences, collectively known as *Al Uloom Al Dakhilia*. Their first grounding, therefore, had been in the religious subjects, and they carried their religious bias to philosophy. The Baghdad School may, therefore, be called the pro-religious school. Yet another centre of learning had existed in Persia even before the advent of the Muslims. There was the school of Jundishapur, and the Greek scholars who had been prosecuted by the Emperor Justinian, were invited by the Persian King to open a centre in his dominions for studying philosophical sciences. The scholars of this school had begun as students of non-religious sciences and only later on, after the advent of Islam, they had to include religious sciences in their curriculum. Thus they possessed a non-religious bias, and they sometimes even carried their philosophical bias to religion. The scholars of Upper Persia and Turkistan usually belonged to this school of thought if they had not previously studied under some professors at Baghdad. Thus the pro-religious school of Baghdad contrasted with the pro-philosophical school of Upper Persia and Turkistan. Avicenna

belonged to Bukhara and had received early education from Turkish teachers; but later on he studied at Baghdad, and thus combined in himself the two tendencies. But even he had the philosophical bias of the Turkish school, although the scholar that he was, he had uniquely welded together the two tendencies in his writings. Now Avicenna had been accepted as the Philosopher of Islam, '*Al Failsoof Al Islam*', and his books had been regarded as standard books on philosophical sciences before the advent of Mullah Mahmood. But, on the other hand, even Avicenna found himself in trouble for his pro-philosophical tendencies. He was declared a renegade by the orthodox theologians for attempting to philosophise on some of the tenets of Muslim belief. The philosopher resented the harshness of the *Ulema* and composed a quatrine, which is as follows :—

It is not easy to declare a man like me an
infidel
There can be no faith greater than my faith.
I am one in this world, and if even I am
an infidel,
Then in the whole world there is not one
Muslim.*

* The original Persian is as follows :—

دفاعی
کفرچون من گزاف و آسان نه بود
ایمان تراز ایمان من ایمان نه بود
در دهر منم یکی و آنهم کافر
پس در همه دهر یک مسلمان نه بود

Mullah Mahmood's Inclinations. Mullah Mahmood's family, which had originally belonged to Mecca and Medina, had passed to India through Baghdad, and his forefathers were great theologians like Imam Salim. We may therefore take it for certain that the family learning of Mullah Mahmood was the Baghdad learning, which must have subsequently been given greater religious bias by the long line of saints and theologians among his ancestors. Had Mullah Mahmood been taught only by his elders in the family, he would most probably have belonged to the religious school. But, we have seen that his grandfather, Mullah Shaikh Shah Muhammad, who began to teach Mullah Mahmood, died in 1032, A. H. when Mullah Mahmood was a boy of nine years only, and therefore unable to acquire any hard and static impressions upon his mind. Then Mullah Mahmood went to Muhammad Afdhal, and we are not told that he studied under any other teacher. Mullah Muhammad Afdhal had studied under his father only, Mufti Shaikh Hamza of Rudauli, who had himself studied in Mazindran, and therefore must have belonged to the Upper Persian and Turkish School. Thus we can be practically sure that Mullah Shaikh Muhammad Afdhal belonged to the pro-philosophical school, and his views differed from those of the Baghdad school as having no religious bias. There can be no doubt that Mullah Mahmood was impressed to the full by his great teacher, and

followed him in all points of view and ways of thought. Without this the teacher could not have loved the disciple so much as to die with grief after forty days of the death of Mullah Mahmood. Love among intellectual men, who are unaffected by the beauty of bodily form, invariably proceeds from mental unanimity and agreement in views. Without perfect spiritual equality two rationally-minded men cannot love each other completely. It seems, therefore, that the bent of Mullah Mahmood's thought and his mental inclinations were more philosophical than religious. Of course this must have been tempered to some extent by the inherited traits of his saintly and pious ancestors, and we can safely say that in the case of Mullah Mahmood his nature interacted upon the influence of nurture and training. The result would be a slight equalisation, approaching that which we have mentioned above as having taken place in the case of Avicenna.

Mullah Mahmood and Avicenna. This accounts for the remarkable correspondence between the views of Mullah Mahmood, as expressed in *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, and those of Avicenna as expressed in the Physics of *Al Shifa*, and *Al Najat*, which has led some adverse critics to declare that *Al Shams Al Bazigha* is nothing but a reproduction of the Physics of Avicenna. But we must not disregard the fact that Mullah Mahmood could not write his book on metaphysics,

where, for all that we can see, he would have widely differed from Avicenna. The cause is not far to seek. There was a very important difference between the mental outlook of Avicenna and Mullah Mahmood. Avicenna was a passionate student of Physics and Medicine and cared little for Mathematics, although he had studied mathematical books also. Mullah Mahmood, on the other hand, was a great Mathematician, and had practically no grounding in Medicine. Now there is a great difference between the Mathematical and the Biological standpoints and ways of thought in philosophy. In the writings of Mullah Mahmood we usually meet with points requiring psychological insight which he has discussed only with the help of logic and abstract reasoning, and some of these instances have been pointed out in the present book in the Editor's Footnotes to the Original. The works of Avicenna, on the other hand, are replete with psychological and medical information. The other point in which Mullah Mahmood differed from Avicenna is that he never laid hands on revered traditions and beliefs and therefore escaped the wrath of the orthodox *Ulema* which sent Avicenna to goal for a time.

The Writings of Mullah Mahmood. Mullah Mahmood was a great writer. His style is dignified, concise, exact and learned, and even in his philosophical writings he preserves his literary graces. He is profuse in diction, judicious

in choice of words, and economical in their use. He writes with ease, grace and fluency, and his sentences, although carefully and studiously formed, appear quite unartificial and spontaneous. He never becomes tedious and dull, and at places indulges in quaint humour and serious suppressed sarcasm, which make his writings pleasant and interesting while retaining their dignity. He was a slow writer, and "progressed very slowly like an ant", as he himself says.* But each step in this slow progress was sure and decisive; for we are told† that he never in his life modified what he had once spoken or written. He seems to have had more command over Arabic than over Persian, as was usually the case with Arabic scholars of those days. Arabic was usually acquired by them studiously, while Persian was practically their vernacular which they little cared to study. The Persian writings of Mullah Mahmood, therefore, though fairly literary, are a good deal inferior to his Arabic books.

(a) *Literary: Al Faraid.* The first book of Mullah Mahmood was *Al Faraid fi Sharh-al-Fawaid*, which he wrote in 1042 A. H., while still a young man of nineteen years. He presented it to the Amir Al Umara Shayista Khan of the court of the Great Mughal Shahjahan. It is a

* *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, Lucknow 1288 A. H., p. 1.

† See ante p. 33.

Commentary on Qadhi Adhd-al-Deen's book *Al Fawaid al Ghayathia*. Mullah Mahmood also wrote notes on his own Commentary, and the notes are greater in bulk than the Commentary. The book has been published and is available in the Indian market. It is a lasting evidence of Mullah Mahmood's literary attainments; and is, according to Azad Bilgrami, "a raining cloud for the garden of Literature"*. The subject-matter of the book is rhetorics. Mullah Mahmood had, of course, to follow the arrangement of the topics in the original book because he was a commentator; but he has filled the commentary and the notes with so much original matter collected from different sources that the commentary tends to become an independent book. The language is Arabic, beautiful, ornate, eloquent and learned, with a freshness and grace which were the natural outcome of a deeply learned youthful mind. The subject-matter has been given a masterly treatment with a powerful analytical exposition, clear, acute discussion, and sane, considered judgment, which give a clear evidence of wide reading, scholarly grasp and clear thinking. Since the time of Mullah Mahmood it has been always studied by students who wish to possess literary attainments in Arabic; and it has been a source of pleasure and delight to scholars who wish to have a model of fine Arabic.

* *Sabhat-al-Marjan* by Azad Bilgrami, Bombay 1303 A. H., p. 53.

(b) *Philosophical.* After writing *Al Faraid*, Mullah Mahmood seems to have devoted his time and attention more to philosophy. From 1042 A. H., when he wrote *Al Faraid*, there begins a period of preparation in Mullah Mahmood's life during which he studied philosophy and planned his books on various branches of the subject. During this period of preparation he wrote only four small booklets for special occasions which we shall discuss presently ; but his more serious thoughts were occupied with the books which he was planning on philosophy. He finished his period of preparation, wrote three small sections of his book on metaphysics, and was on the verge of finishing his book on physics when he suddenly died without even getting time to write a preface to his already finished book. It seems desirable to quote his own statement in the preface of *Al Shams Al Bazigha*,* which was written by his disciple according to his instructions. "I stood up to teach what Allah had taught me and revealed to me as clear truth and all-conviction, concerning the principles of true, real, certain philosophy, which should be fully balanced in the scale of argumentation..... I began with a wonderful book, and its commentary, with a proper arrangement : the book entitled *Al Hikmat Al Baligha*, and the commentary *Al Shams Al Bazigha*. But I proceeded with the writing slowly like an ant, while time was busy

**Al Shams Al Bazigha*, Lucknow 1298 A. H., p. 1.

hastening to me my death. Thus in the middle, when I had already written out the major portion of my book, of which a part still remained to be written, and had written very little of metaphysics, a fatal acute disease surrounded me and the drum of departure was beaten for me. Now what I had written of my physics was practically all that I had planned; but what I had time to write on metaphysics were only certain discourses on topics approaching the arrangement of chapters, which I had decided for my book on metaphysics. Of these there are only fragments without any arrangement, which are discourses bearing upon first principles of Matter which I brought together in a tract entitled *Al Dawhat Al Mayadat fi Hadiqat Al Surat wal Maddah*". This is the best description of his scheme of composition which unfortunately was never completed. We are told by Mullah Nizam-al-Deen Sahalvi,* (died 1161 A. H.), that while still busy with the final writing of his book on physics, *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, he was attacked suddenly with a fatal sickness and died within ten days. He knew that he could not escape death, and he dictated the above short preface or at least entrusted its writing to his trusted disciple. His death probably also prevented him from writing a book on Mathematics which surely would have been

*He has also written notes on *Al Shams al Bazigha* of Mullah Mahmood.

very valuable as containing the views of a man who was a mathematician and an astronomer of a very high order.

The philosophical writings which he left on his deathbed are four in number :—

(1) *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, published in Lucknow, (1288 A. H.).

(2) *Al Dauhat Al Mayadat fi Hadiqat Al Surat wal Maddah*,

(3) *Risalat fi Tahqiq Al Kulli wal Juza'i al Tabiyi*,

and (4) *Risalat fi Tahqiq Irtifa Al Naqidhain*.

The latter three have been published as appendices to the Lucknow edition of the first. These, together with *Jabr-o-Ikhtiar*, are his only books on philosophy. It is hardly possible in the brief scope of the present book to give an exposition of the above books or to discuss their doctrines critically. The right place for this would be the edition of *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, the most important and the biggest book of Mullah Mahmood, which the present writer intends to bring out in the future. A description of the books, however, so as to point out the topics with which they deal may not be out of place here ; and it will give to the reader an idea of the books.

Al Shams Al Bazigha.

This book is on physics, and is a finished work on the subject. It is in the form of a book and a commentary, both written by Mullah Mahmood, and this shows the great love of mediaeval scholars for commentaries. The chapters and the topics discussed are as follows :—

Part I: On Principles of Physics

Discourse I.

Section 1.—On Method, Data and Principles of Physics.

Section 2.—On a Discussion of all these. (This comprises discussion on Matter, Form, Non-Being, the combination of these three, the Physical Agent which is called Motion, the technical terms of Physics like Body etc., the Final Cause in Physics etc.)

Section 3.—On Fate and Contingency and Allied Topics.

Section 4.—On Physical Causality.

Discourse II.—On General Properties of Bodies.

Chapter I.—On the Finitude and Infinitude of Bodies in Division and Bulk.

Section 1.—On the Infinitude of Bodies in Division.

Section 2.—On the Impossibility of Infinitude of Bodies in Bulk.

Chapter II.—On Space.

Section 1. On the Essence and Nature of Space.

Section 2. On the Disproof of Vacuum.

Chapter III.—On Motion and Rest.

Section 1.—Motion is Numerically One.

Section 2.—Correspondence and non-correspondence in Motions.

Section 3.—Contradiction in Motions.

Section 4.—The Impossibility of two generically same motions being differently related to the same object.

Section 5.—Essential and Accidental Motion.

Section 6.—Physical motion does not flow from essence as such.

Section 7.—Energy, not being a quantity and incapable of quantification, cannot either be called finite or infinite in essence.

Section 8.—Bodies must always have a physical state like quantity, shape, etc.

Section 9.—All motion is between a beginning and an end.

Section 10.—Objects having a natural circular motion cannot have a vertical motion.

Section 11.—On Accidental Motion.

Section 12.—On Natural Forced Motion.

Section 13.—On Time. (This is a very important section, and in it is to be found Mullah Mahmood's famous criticism of Mir Baqir Damad, who held that time is not eternal. Mullah Mahmood's thesis is that *absolutely* time is not eternal, but *temporally* it is eternal.)

Section 14.—On the Wrong Conceptions of Time.

Section 15.—On Direction.

Section 16.—On Circular Motion.

Section 17.—On the impossibility of vertical motion in spherical bodies.

Part II.—The Universe.

Discourse III.

Section 1.—On the Properties of Simple and Compound Bodies, and kinds of simple motions, and elements in motion.

Section 2.—The Universe of Bodies is as a whole one, Finite and Spherical.

Part III.—Creation and Becoming.

Discourse IV.

Section 1.—Compound Bodies occupy space and change.

Section 2.—Refutation of those who deny change in the Universe.

The book is a classical work on Muslim Physics, and is replete with mathematical and astronomical discussions, which are not usually found in Arabic books. The doctrines, as has been said, are similar to those of Avicenna, in his *Al-Shifa*, with certain differences. There could not be much original matter in the book so far as general principles and points of view are concerned, but in the filling up of details much new ground has been broken and the book deserves close study.

Al Dauhat Al Mayadat.

The name of the book translated into English would be "The Luxuriant Tree in the Garden of Matter and Form". This small booklet would have found its proper place as a chapter in the book on metaphysics which Mullah Mahmood intended to write. It is written in the same way as *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, with an original and a commentary, both by the author. It is divided into three sections: the first proves the existence of matter, the second the necessary connection between form and matter, and the third discusses the arrangement of form and matter in creation and becoming.

Risalat Fi Tahqiq Al Kulli Wal Juza'i.

This small tract also is a chapter of his book on logic, which he had planned in his mind. Its subject-matter is Universal and Particular. It comprises only two sections: the first gives an

exposition of the terms Universal and Particular, and discusses their various applications, and the second deals with the difficulty of Aristotelian Logic, how the genus can be Universal as well as Substance.

Risalat Fi Tahqiq Irtifa Al Naqidhain.

This is a very small tract of about three hundred words only. It is not written in the form of an original and a commentary, and hence it seems to have been an independent tract rather than a section of the books on philosophy which he had planned. It discusses the different meanings and applications of the term contradictory. It contains an interesting remark by Mullah Mahmood that every negation has some assertion within it.

Risalah Jabr-o-Ikhtiar.

This is a very small tract on Determinism and Freewill which Mullah Mahmood wrote in Persian and enclosed in a letter. It has been edited in the present book. Maulavi Muhammad Abdul Hai of Lucknow, mistakes the name of this tract, and calls it *Risalat fi Tahqiq Al Qadha wal Qadar**.

(c) *Religious*. Apart from the above books which practically complete the list of Mullah Mahmood's writings, there are two small tracts which he

* *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, Lucknow, 1288 A. H., last page.

wrote on religious topics. One was *Matnun Mateen* on dogmatics, mentioned by Hafiz Abid Husain, in his Foreword to *Jabr-o-Ikhtiar*, and the other was *Risalat fi Wahdat Al Wujood*, a tract on pantheism, mentioned by Maulavi Muhammad Abdul Hai of Lucknow*. Both must have been very important as embodying the author's views on religion and Sufism, but unfortunately they are not extant.

(d) *Miscellaneous*. Mullah Mahmood wrote yet another tract of four pages in Persian, entitled *Fi Aqsam-i-Niswan* †(On Kinds of Women), in which he classified women according to their voice, gait and bearing, longevity, grades of love, etc., gave to each kind a particular name, and composed beautiful poems for each.

These are the nine books which Mullah Mahmood left behind him. Who should not like to have such worthy sons, as Plato writes of Homer !

* *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, Lucknow, 1288 A. H., last page.

† *Maasir-al-Kiram* by Azad Bilgrami, Agra, 1910, p. 203.

Chapter III.

Mullah Mahmood's Determinism and Freewill.

Its Composition. The devil of sickness and disease, as we have seen, did not allow Mullah Mahmood to complete his scheme of writing on all branches of philosophy : he could not even write his book on metaphysics, which would have been followed by Ethics. We have thus been deprived of a valuable book on Moral Philosophy which would decidedly have been a solid contribution to Muslim Philosophical literature. The present treatise on Determinism and Freewill cannot in any sense be termed a book. Mullah Mahmood himself terms it a 'discourse' and a 'tract'. It has been written in Persian and not in Arabic, the medium of all learned composition in those days, and hence we should not regard it as a scholarly composition designed for study by serious and advanced students of Religion and Philosophy. It is only a hasty composition, written probably in a couple of hours, with a frail constitution and a sick mind and heart.

The introductory Epistle describes the circumstance of its composition. Mullah Mahmood, as we have seen, had been invited to Akbarabad, and had there formed intimacy with Asif Khan and Shayista Khan. After his return he probably continued correspondence with them. Then he seems to have fallen very ill, and not written any letter for a long time. While yet in the convalescent state, he thought of resuming his correspondence with one of the nobles, and of sending a letter as a substitute for personal attendance. As his object was 'simply to remind himself to the high personality', he sought introduction by writing a suitable tract, befitting himself and suitable for the great court'. This he sent as a 'present' to the great noble at Akbarabad. This habit of sending literary presents to their patrons was prevalent among the scholars and poets of those days.

The name of the patron, unfortunately, has not been mentioned in the letter. We know that Mullah Mahmood had been to the court of Shah-jahan, and had formed intimacy with Asif Khan and Shayista Khan, both *Amir-al-Umara* in their time. The external evidence is silent as to the name of the addressee, and neither history nor any tradition in Mullah Mahmood's family sheds any light on this point. We have, therefore, to fall back upon internal criticism only. The form of address and the numerous phrases in the Epistle reveal that the addressee could not have been a King, much less

one of the great Mughal potentates. We are thus left with Asif Khan and Shayista Khan only. Now Shayista Khan was not a student of philosophy, and we can hardly expect him to understand fully the intricate doctrines couched in aphoristic phrases with which the Tract is replete. Moreover, he was a strict Asharite, an enthusiastic supporter of Aurangzib's strict orthodox regime, and by conviction and faith a believer in determinism. One can hardly expect Mullah Mahmood, or any other scholar, to be impolite enough to send in a friendly letter a refutation of the Asharite position to Shayista Khan. Asif Khan, on the other hand, was a Persian by descent, who would naturally prefer the Persian language to Arabic, a non-Asharite, and a believer in the moderate non-deterministic doctrine, which has been accepted and supported in the Tract. He had moreover some taste for philosophy, and with reference to him Mullah Mahmood could write, as he does, that the book is "befitting himself and suitable for the great court". Surely, a Persian Tract, disclosing non-Asharite doctrines, could only be suitable for the court of Asif Khan.

The adventitious composition of the book should not be taken to minimise its value or importance. We know that Mullah Mahmood had planned to write books on all branches of philosophy, and we have no reason to believe that he had not made at least a mental sketch of his views on moral philosophy. However hasty might be the composition,

we must remember that it has emerged from a master-mind, and as such it must embody scholarly views and sane doctrines. Mullah Mahmood himself does not seem to have deprecated it; for he kept a copy for himself which was copied out by later generations.

The Text. In the natural course we should expect to find copies of the book with his disciples or his descendants. It seems, however, that the students of philosophy did not value the book very much; for one can hardly find evidence that the book was possessed by most of the scholars who flourished after Mullah Mahmood. We do not find any mention of the book in the list of his works prepared by biographers. Even Azad Bilgrami does not make any mention of the book in his *Maasir-al-Kiram, Sabhat-al-Marjan* or *Tadhkira*. The learned student of philosophy, Maulavi Muhammad Abdul Hai of Lucknow, who has annotated Mullah Mahmood's *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, discloses a strange ignorance of this book. He mentions a book in Persian, *Risalat fi Tahqiq Al Qadha wal Qadar*, which is apparently this same tract *Jabr-o-Ikhtiar*. This means that Maulavi Muhammad Abdul Hai included the book into the list of Mullah Mahmood's works on the strength of report, but without having seen the book himself. The descendants of Mullah Mahmood also do not seem to have preserved any copy of this book; for we know definitely from the Foreword of Hafiz Abid Husain, a descendant of Mullah Mahmood,

that he chanced to find the book only when he went to Allahabad. The book was, however, preserved in various copies in the city of Jaunpur, and was most probably taken with them by the learned families who migrated to Allahabad and Ghazipur. Hafiz Abid Husain found the book, as he says in the Foreword, in some family of scholars at Allahabad, and the copious extracts of the book given in *Mi'raj-al-'Uqool* by Saiyid Muhammad Murtadha of Ghazipur, one of the greatest Muslim thinkers who died some fifteen years ago, prove that he possessed a copy of the book.

The text from which the present edition has been made is a copy of the one which Hafiz Abid Husain found at Allahabad. It is in the handwriting of some scribe employed by Hafiz Abid Husain, and not the original which he discovered. To all appearances the original was itself a very faulty and defective text; and Hafiz Abid Husain, who was learned enough, as his Foreword goes to show, to have been able to correct mistakes of script, seems to have entertained some emotional or reverent scruples for getting the original copied out with all its defects, and hence he might have abstained from making corrections. The whole story of his acquiring the text is mentioned by him in his Foreword. He probably entertained an idea of publishing the book, and on that occasion he would have naturally corrected the mistakes in the transcript; but the idea never materialised. This copy

of Hafiz Abid Husain was preserved in the family and has now become the property of his worthy grandson, the Hon'ble Dr. Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, who was kind enough to lend the manuscript to the editor. The editor has compared this text with the quotations to be found in the *Mir-raj-al-'Uqool* mentioned above, and combining them with two or three guesses, has endeavoured to construct a text which may safely be regarded as fairly perfect.

The Authenticity of the Text. As regards the authenticity of the Tract and the text there can be no doubt. The style and other literary characteristics are well befitting the author of *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, the evidence of Hafiz Abid Husain is conclusive, and the testimony of Saiyid Muhammad Murtadha is very valuable as coming from a scholar of philosophy who was closely connected with Jaunpur, the birth-place of Mullah Mahmood.

Hafiz Abid Husain's Foreword. To come now to the book, we meet at the very opening with the Foreword of Hafiz Abid Husain. It is written in high-flown ornate Arabic, and shows that the writer was well-versed in the Arabic language. Unfortunately, however, it follows the old style of eulogising the author and his book, and is quite silent as to the facts of Mullah Mahmood's

life and the circumstance of the composition of the book itself. While accepting the eulogies as tolerably just and proper, we cannot but feel sorry for the fact that Hafiz Abid Husain has not enlightened us more about Mullah Mahmood and his book as he could have very well done. It has been translated, and the reader can himself go through it. Its only value is that it describes how the original text came into the hands of Hafiz Abid Husain.

Language and Style. The Foreword of Hafiz Abid Husain takes us to the original book. In the beginning we meet with an Epistle addressed most probably to Asif Khan of the Court Shahjahan, which we have described in the beginning of the present chapter. Next to the Epistle comes the small tract which deals with the philosophical and religious aspects of the Problem of Will.

The language of both the Epistle and the Tract is Persian. We have nothing but praise for the language and the style. It is beautiful, ornate Persian, melodious and sweet, not so highly artificial as was the fashion of the day, and is full of words, constructions and phrases, of which any Persian writer could be proud. The subject-matter of the Tract is not light literature but abstruse philosophy, and when we remember this fact we all the more admire the great writer who could at once write perfect literary language and describe simply, exactly, and concisely, doctrines connected with the difficult Problem of Will. Only the author of *Al*

Faraid could do it, and in this respect Mullah Mahmood can well claim great credit and originality.

Analysis. The contents of the book may be analysed as follows :—

The Foreword of Hafiz Abid Husain.

The Epistle of Mullah Mahmood.

1. The rejection of the extreme Determinism of the Asharites on the strength of an appeal to the intuitive reason.
2. The exposition of the Mu'tazilite view—the extreme libertarian view that man is absolutely free, and owing to this freedom is liable to rewards and punishments. This view is shortsighted.
3. Mullah Mahmood's creed.

Man has determined freedom: his actions are voluntary, but his volition is constrained ; for :

Man's actions being contingent require a cause

This cause is the relation between man's power and Will

This relation, being contingent, itself requires a determinative

This determinative must have its causes

This chain of causes finally ends in the Will of God

or else, we must believe in contingency without a cause, which is absurd.

4. Objections and their replies.

- A. (i) The older Mu'tazilites' contention that Will requires no determinative, but prefers one out of two equal alternatives.

Reply (i) Absolute equality of alternatives will stop
action

The very occurrence of action requires de-
terminative

Will itself cannot be this determinative

Presupposing another act of Will as deter-
minative will lead to infinite regress.

(ii) Voluntary actions cannot be exempted from
the general law for the impossibility of pre-
ference without a determinative.

(iii) Restatement of the metaphysical doctrine
that the absolute equality of the two phases
of the possible, though rationally a fact,
is a fiction as an objective reality.

B. Constrained freedom should be no responsi-
bility.

Reply : Action results from complex perfect cause,
and responsibility is one among the many
complete causes.

Responsibility, therefore, is instrumental in
causing action.

5. Further exposition of Mullah Mahmood's creed.

Will has twofold inclinations : one higher, the
other lower

On this conflict of inclinations is placed respon-
sibility

Religion helps Will to incline to virtue and shun
vice

Sometimes distortion of nature or disregard for
religion does not allow the Will to incline to
virtue

But this cannot be taken to wipe out responsibility

Social and moral structures require that responsi-
bility should be uniformly universal.

6. Supplementary objections and their replies.

A. Punishment and reward would be unjustified

Reply : Punishment is a necessary consequence of sin, not revenge.

B. Bodily punishment cannot be explained

Reply : (i) The material woes of the next world may have a necessary connection with the sins of this world, though we may not grasp this connection.

(ii) The Sufi standpoint that our actions are embodied as material woes.

C. Forgiveness and intercession cannot be explained

Reply : (i) Presence of some interdicts may check punishment, we do not know them, and hence term them forgiveness

(ii) When these interdicts are due to the spirituality of the Prophet, they are called intercession.

7. Conclusion with a reference to the Sufi standpoint that God is the only cause.

Exposition and Criticism.

The Epistle (a) Language. Now to pass on to a detailed examination and exposition of the contents of the Tract. The forwarding Epistle contains three points of interest. The first is a warning that the Tract has been written in a very condensed and concise language, which means that the reader should be very careful about each single word which may some time contain a

definite philosophical doctrine. Instances of this have been pointed out in the Persian Footnotes to the Original.

(b) *Nature of the Problem.* The second is a remark about the nature of the Problem of Will that it is a very difficult problem because in it we may be sometimes faced with two conflicting arguments which may be practically of equal strength. The point has been well brought out by Al Farabi. "Things", he says,* "are either necessary or possible. Our discourse about the possible is based on empirical generalisations, and is in the sphere of possibility (i. e., contingency). It is not impossible, therefore, to find proof for it as well as its opposite. Our discourse in the sphere of necessity (i.e., necessary truths), however, is based on things that exist necessarily or disexist necessarily—in the first case the proof is necessarily true and the opposite is invalid and absurd, and in the second case the opposite is necessarily true and the positive proof is invalid". Now, because the Problem of Will is concerned with human actions, it makes use of contingent truths and hence contradictory arguments of equal strength may appear. In short, Mullah Mahmood very candidly remarks that in problems of practical philosophy we cannot

* Vide the present writer's Article on *Al Farabi*, in the *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Poona, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 60.

find arguments as exact as we find in theoretical philosophy and mathematics, and hence conclusive clear-cut proofs cannot be given.

(c) *Claim for Originality.* The third point in the Epistle is the claim of Mullah Mahmood that "uptil the present time none of the learned doctors has spoken with so much subtlety and truth in elucidating and purifying this rare subject and uncommon topic : nor has anyone cleared away so well thorn and straw of doubt and fancy from the path of argument and way of belief ". This, on the face of it, seems to be a claim for absolute originality. The student of the history of Muslim Philosophy and Theology, however, can see only too plainly that so far as arguments and doctrines are concerned there is nothing new or original in the Tract. Neither in his criticism of others, nor in the exposition of his positive doctrines, does Mullah Mahmood advance any argument which had not already been discussed threadbare by his predecessors. His position is midway between determinism and libertarianism, that of determined freedom or constrained liberty which we shall presently discuss. Now, this doctrine had been prevalent among Muslims even in the first century of the Hegira era, and began to be committed to writing from the second century A. H., i. e., some eight hundred years before the advent of Mullah Mahmood. In the Footnotes to the Original, has been given a list of chief

theologians, religious doctors and philosophers who have discussed and explained this doctrine, and the names of their books in which the discussions are to be found. A parallel passage from Al Farabi (d. circa 339 A. H.) has also been given there which includes practically all that Mullah Mahmood has to say. We shall, however, be deceived if we believe that Mullah Mahmood has borrowed doctrines from others and posed as their original author. He was far above this, and from what we have seen of his philosophical calibre and mental greatness we cannot for a moment entertain the idea that he craved for false originality or unmerited praise. Fortunately he himself makes the position of the commentator clear; for he introduces the positive doctrine of the book with the sentence that "truth-seekers have seen unveiled further than this with their rational eye". This means that he himself does not want us to give him the credit of originality so far as the doctrines and arguments are concerned. In what, then, does he claim originality and precedence over the learned doctors? The originality consists in the method of treatment, the arrangement of topics, the masterly and acute analysis of the subject-matter, the concise but full discussion, the simple language with a judiciously fine mixture of technical and non-technical words, and the beautiful Persian in which the whole doctrine has been presented. Understood in this light, the claim will stand the severest test of criticism.

In all justice to the great Mullah, we must confess that he has grouped together, with a masterly scholarship, discussions to be found in different books and in tedious and technical language, cleared them of their controversial colour, and focussed the main points of various arguments at one point so as to reveal their exact and true value and to give to the reader a clear and just idea of the whole problem. This certainly had not been done before him in Persian.

The Problem of the Tract. The subject of discussion in the Tract is the Problem of Will, which is not only a philosophical but also a religious and practical problem. This problem has figured large in sectarian and theological controversies in all advanced religions, for it is closely connected with the responsibility of man and the rewards or punishments in the next world. In Muslim theological controversies, however, it assumed extraordinary importance, and became the crux of sectarian disputes and dogmatic debates. With the exception of the Problem of the Attributes of Allah, no other philosophical problem has been so much debated in Islam, and not only ink but blood has been spilt in disputations over it. The problem, therefore, as it presented itself to Mullah Mahmood, had a double aspect, a religious and a philosophical one, and he has endeavoured to combine the two sides with a masterly control which is admirable. Throughout the Tract the

religious points have never been lost sight of, although the method of discussion and argumentation is philosophical and no appeals have been made to dogmatic beliefs in the Traditions or the Quran. This enables Mullah Mahmood to put before his readers an impartial view of the subject-matter. It is true that in the last three sections the discussion tends to become more and more dogmatic, but that probably because the questions taken up there are themselves non-philosophical and require a dogmatic treatment.

The Historical Background of the Problem.

In Islam the philosophical schools of determinism and libertarianism are represented by the theological sects of the Asharites and the Mu'tazilites. The Asharites generally believe that man is a mere tool in the hands of God and all his actions are determined, while the Mu'tazilites advocate that man is not only the sole *agent* but also the *creator* of his actions. We have used the word 'generally' because sometimes we meet with exceptions when an individual or even a small group has a different belief in some unimportant detail; but the broad gulf between the two schools has never been bridged. Between these two extremes is the position of the Shia'ites, or more precisely the Twelvers, who believe in the moderate doctrine of constrained liberty—'the mean between the two extremes', as they call it.

Muslim thinkers, as has been explained elsewhere,* are divided into three groups —, *Failsoof*, *Nazir* or *Hakeem* and *Mutakallim*. The *failasifa*, or the pure philosophers of the Aristotelian school, as well as the *Nazireen* or *Hukama*, like Al Farabi, Ibn-i-Sina, Ibn-i-Miskawayh, Naseer-al-Deen of Tus, Ibn-i-Rushd and others, usually advocate moderate libertarianism or the intermediate doctrine of constrained liberty. Al Kindi seems to be the only exception who, although a *failsoof*, advocates determinism; but he was probably afraid of speaking in favour of the Mu'tazilites, having been once prosecuted by the Abbaside court for this same crime.† The *Mutakallimoon*, or the religious thinkers, whenever they belong to the orthodox School, usually defend determinism because the orthodox religious standpoint compels them to do so, although considerations of sound thinking sometimes compel them to moderate their extreme view or to give it a particular meaning and significance. Their state of mind is clearly apparent when we look into the different books of such men as Fakhr-al-Deen of Rai, Sa'ad-al-Deen and Muhammad Al Ghazali who have written some books as *failasifa*, others as *Mutakallimoon*, and yet others as religious divines. In their philosophical books they advocate constrained liberty and reject determinism, while in their books on Dogmatics these same

* & † See the present writer's *History of Islamic Philosophy*.

scholars defend with all fervour the orthodox standpoint of determinism. The *Mutakallimoon*, however, when they belong to the Shia'te or the Twelver group, deny both libertarianism and determinism categorically and advocate with one voice the doctrine of constrained liberty in all their books without any exception. The unanimity of this group is remarkable.

The Sufis or the mystics of Islam, usually advocate determinism, because they are compelled by their pantheistic tendencies to deny all causes but God.

Mullah Mahmood's Standpoint. Mullah Mahmood was a professed Hanafite and Asharite ; but as we have seen he was essentially a philosopher and he cared more for rational consistency and truth than dogmatic beliefs. Hence he advocates the standpoint of *falasifa*, and the belief of the Twelvers in the Tract, only that in his criticisms he lays reverent hands on the Asharite doctrines and Hanafi beliefs, to which he was himself supposed to subscribe as a true believer.

The Plan of the Tract. The general form of the Tract gives it a theological colouring, the terminology is mixed theological and philosophical, and the treatment of arguments and doctrines is essentially philosophical. It has been arranged logically and not historically. The Asharite view has been first taken up and

summarily dismissed, the Mu'tazilite standpoint has been then discussed at some length, and then follows a positive statement of Mullah Mahmood's creed, the intermediate doctrine. After that certain objections have been replied to, some doubts have been cleared, and the Tract finishes with a graceful reference to the Sufi standpoint.

Detailed Sectional Exposition and Criticism.

I. Intuitive Reason Rejects Determinism.

The Tract opens with an appeal to the intuitive reason for establishing the fact that actions of man have a close connection with his volition and are as such distinguished from mineral forces and animal activities which are mechanical and constrained. Here we find the Asharite doctrine referred to and rejected. It appears that a fear of the orthodox *Ulema* prevented Mullah Mahmood from explicitly criticising the school; but his rejection is philosophically well-founded, and its method is admirable. A glance at the Editor's Footnotes to the Original will show that the great orthodox divines, Abu Hanifa, Abul Hasan Al Ash'ari and Abdul Wahhab had passed stringent judgments against the renegade who should dare to deny determinism. The doctrine had been backed for more than hundred years by the sword of the Abbasides, and long before the time of Mullah Mahmood had been accepted as the only right belief for the orthodox Muslims. In India, the

might of the *Ulema*, which had suffered by the Infalliability Decree of Akbar the Great (1579), had been practically re-established during the reign of Jahangir; and Qadhi Noor Allah of Shoostar, whom Akbar had appointed the grand Qadhi of Lahore, had dearly paid for opposing some of the Asharite doctrines by being flayed alive. It could not be safe, therefore, for Mullah Mahmood, with the memory of the outrage fresh in his mind, to excite the bigotted *Ulema*. Nevertheless he was a truth-seeker and had the courage of his convictions. He, therefore, makes only an indirect reference to the belief but brings a very powerful argument to bear against it. He seems to say that inspite of logical jugglings and theological arguments the fact remains that determinism is false; for our inner nature and consciousness contradict determinism on every occasion when we initiate a voluntary action. We are conscious of our actions, we are also conscious of an effort in ourselves at the time of acting, and on this rock of intuitive certainty must be wrecked all theological arguments and logical disputations. This argument of Mullah Mahmood is the final word against extreme determinism.

II. The Mu'tazilite Doctrine. The Mu'tazilite doctrine is taken up next. Mullah Mahmood describes it at length and gives an admirable summary. "Man and all animals are absolutely free and fully empowered in deliberate actions and willed movements....After relating

power and will in man, the power and will of God have no connection with the actions of man". This is the general position of the Mu'tazilites, and perhaps no libertarian could go further. The earlier Mu'tazilites, while advocating liberty, spoke of man as only the *agent*, but later on controversies pushed them to the extent of maintaining that man was as well the *creator* of his actions. Mullah Mahmood has already said that intuition reveals freewill, and he is too much of a metaphysician and serious thinker to indulge into the unfruitful, dry, logical controversies regarding details, or appeals to the Traditions and verses of the Quran, with which the disputations between the Asharites and Mu'tazilites had been protracted. Hence he only makes a general criticism against them from the metaphysical standpoint. He calls the Mu'tazilites shortsighted because they failed to see a cause in the world beyond the limited human will. The criticism is sensibly magnanimous and acutely logical.

III. Mullah Mahmood's Creed. Having shown that both extreme determinism and libertarianism are untenable, Mullah Mahmood passes on to the positive statement of the doctrine which mediates between determinism and libertarianism, —that of determined freedom or constrained liberty. The Mu'tazilites had been short-sighted and hence had lost sight of the ultimate cause. The Will, of course, is the immediate cause

of human actions; but the Will itself has a cause which is in a sense the ultimate cause of our actions. Hence our capacity and power and Will being dependent on a cause, absolute liberty is taken out of our actions and they become partly determined. Mullah Mahmood, as we should naturally expect from the author of *Al Shams Al Bazigha*, is a staunch believer in the Law of Causality, and has emphasised its universal application with full force. In this section, however, he mixes up very admirably and in his usual condensed style this question with the question of a determinative, so that the same statement at once acquires both metaphysical and psychological colouring. It is rather unfortunate that he does not show in psychology the same insight as in metaphysics, and badly confuses the terms 'volition', 'choice' and 'determination', which had been distinguished and clearly defined before his time by Al Farabi (d. circa 339 A. H.)* This interchange of terms, which at times tends to become misleading, makes the original a bit difficult to understand. The action takes place, he says, when choice and volition become inter-related. This relation being a contingent and not a necessary entity stands in need of a determinative which should be its cause. This determinative, according to Mullah Mahmood, must be caused by something outside the will of man, otherwise we

*A quotation from Al Farabi in the original Arabic is given in the Footnotes to the Original.

shall be faced with infinite regress or argument in a circle. The ultimate cause of the determinative thus becomes the Will of God, for the whole universe is bound in the chain of causes and effects. The connection between choice and volition takes place necessarily when the cause (i. e. the determinative which is related to, and determined by, something outside man's will) is present, but becomes impossible when the cause is absent. "Man", therefore, "has determined freedom and constrained volition: his actions are voluntary, but his will is restrained".

While accepting the general doctrine of Mullah Mahmood, we cannot but remark that he has been rather careless in speaking of determinative as something external. Leibniz wrote in his fifth letter to Clarke: "It is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to image everything in a corporeal manner, to conceive that actuating reasons are something external, which make an impression on the mind, and to distinguish *motives* from the *active principle* (*principio actionis*) itself".* We might be ready to believe that in determining we are practically constrained by our character. A man, it is said, may be free to act as he likes, but is never free to like as he likes. His actions disclose his character; but character is nothing but nature modified by circumstances; and however much

*Vide *Op. Omn.* Erdmann's Ed. p. 754, quoted by Hamilton, Reid's Work, p. 610.

they may continue to modify it, it remains nothing but the resultant of these two. All this would be interpreting self-determination as if it meant merely freedom from constraint, but involved no freedom to initiate. But we cannot acquiesce in such an interpretation. It might be very difficult, or even impossible, for metaphysics and psychology to tell the real essence either of men or trees ; but it must be accepted that man's nature is his character, and it would be an act of psychological barbarism to take the human character out of human nature and assign to it an external cause. So far as the external circumstances are concerned, they are more often only *occasions*. So far from man's character being determined by them, the circumstances receive their character from him, or else they will have no character at all. To man pertains the standard by which their values are judged, and to him the motives they may occasion owe their strength. The self-conscious human being must be distinguished from brutes, because he has an ideal and can determine motives to realise that ideal. Freedom is not only negative, i. e., not mere freedom from constraint, but also positive, i. e. freedom to initiate, to turn circumstances to account. The determinative or the choice of man, therefore, should not be regarded as something external to Will and Consciousness. In such artificial bifurcation one smells the Faculty Psychology of the Aristotelians. The doctrine of Mullah Mahmood

would have been healthier if he had limited himself to the metaphysical argument, and said that the will itself is caused and created by God, and hence in strict logical consistency we must deny absolute freedom in willed actions.

The argument of this section is not original as Mullah Mahmood himself admits. It has been fully demonstrated in the Footnotes to the Original and even mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that the doctrine had been previously advocated by a group of thinkers, viz., most of the *falasifa*, a few of the Mu'tazilites, one or two liberal Asharites, and the Twelvers *en bloc*.

IV.—Objections and their Replies. Having given us an explanation of the doctrine which he considered to be the true one, Mullah Mahmood proceeds to reply to certain objections. As has been said above, the question of freedom of will had been debated for more than a century, and innumerable valid and invalid criticisms had been levelled against the different doctrines from the opposing camps. There is, therefore, no dearth of objections in Arabic literature on the Problem of Will. It is gratifying, however, to find that Mullah Mahmood does not at all indulge in formal logic or dry and unfruitful discussions over interpretations of various texts of the Traditions and the Quran; but devotes himself to questions of real philosophical interest only.

(a) *Will Requires no Determinative.* Mullah Mahmood substantiates his position of determined freedom by saying that the determinative, which makes the action possible, is caused from the outside. This means that the extreme libertarian view of the Mu'tazilites had to be modified. The history of these controversies reveals to us that the question of determinative had been the Herculean heel of the Mu'tazilites. Hence the earlier members of the group had taken the hardihood to deny the very existence of the determinative. Will, they had advocated, accepts one of the two absolutely equal alternatives, and hence no determinative is required. The later Mu'tazilites however had come to believe that a determinative is necessary. This only means that in Theology the question had lost its living importance; but Mullah Mahmood takes it into consideration owing to its permanent importance for philosophy.

Mullah Mahmood very candidly points out in reply that "if the relation of Will with one alternative, and the absence of this relation, are both equal, the presence of this relation and not its absence will be preference without a determinative". He means to say that in the case of absolute equality of alternatives no action can follow; but the occurrence of the action being a fact, preference must be present there. Now in preference, although Mullah Mahmood does not say that, valuation and

motivation are present, which require a determinative. Will itself, says he, cannot be this determinative, for determinative is connected with the object rather than with the subject. The Mu'tazilites may say at this stage that another act of will is the determinative; for we know that the preference of the higher in some instances is the result of a new act of subjective selection. This position, says Mullah Mahmood, will lead into infinite regress or argument in a circle; for he wants that the determinative must be somehow taken out of the domain of the human Will and referred to something external. In these days of psychological enlightenment we may find a good deal arbitrary in the above position of Mullah Mahmood; but we must remember that what he has said was sufficient for his contemporaries.

There could now be only one way of escape from the dilemma for the Mu'tazilites. They sought to seek an exception from the time-honoured principle of the impossibility of preference without a determinative. For this they are rebuked by Mullah Mahmood. It is useless to talk with a man, he says, who seeks exception from universal rational principles. Of course it is so, because we always expect that our adversary should respect the universal laws and axioms of the science with which we may be dealing. This way of escape devised by the Mu'tazilites and the rebuke of Mullah Mahmood go to show that the question was discussed

only from the logical side, and psychological considerations were not at all involved, and hence we may refrain from examining the doctrine from that standpoint:

This attempt to seek exception from the general law of logic enrages Mullah Mahmood further, who flings himself headlong into the most difficult metaphysical problem of being and non-being, necessary and contingent existence, and declares as an absolute general law that the absolute equality of the possible in being and non-being, though rationally a fact, is only a fiction in reality. In the Editor's Footnotes to the Original has been appended a quotation from Ibn-i-Sina to explain how the Muslim thinkers understood this problem, and any further remarks at this place do not seem desirable.

The Incomplete Treatment of the Problem.
With the close of this section the Tract practically loses its philosophical interest, and in what follows we only meet with questions of theological interest, the explanations of which tend to become more and more dogmatic. It is rather unfortunate that Mullah Mahmood should have left the problem exactly where we would expect him to explain certain difficulties. He advocates that the Will of Man in determination and initiation is constrained by certain external elements, and this apparently re-establishes the deterministic doctrine which he has rejected in the

very beginning of the Tract. It was, therefore, expected that at this stage he would say something by way of explanation which should strengthen his doctrine of determined freedom. He, however, fails to do so, and strangely enough passes on to the question of religious responsibility quite silently and simply, as if he wants us to lose sight of the difficulty and pass on quite unconsciously to other questions. It can be hardly believed that the difficulty was not present before his mind ; for discussions pertaining to it were present in his time in other books on the subject. To suppose that he could not offer a solution of the problem or at least reproduce in his fine Persian the best arguments of others would be fighting in the face of facts. We can, therefore, only conclude that for some reasons he wanted to evade a clear-cut refutation of determinism which any attempt to clear the difficulty would have necessarily involved. It might even have been due to the fear of the *Ulema*. It may not be desirable at this place to raise, simply for the purpose of discussion, a question which Mullah Mahmood has not even referred to. A quotation, however, has been appended in the Footnotes to the Original which may satisfy those who wish to learn what Muslim thinkers had to say on that question. It is from Mullah Abd-al-Razzaq Lahiji, who flourished some time after Mullah Mahmood.

(b) *Constrained Freedom Should Bear No Responsibility.* The second objection to the doctrine of Mullah Mahmood is that "although man is free in his actions, his freedom is bound with constraint, and the responsibility of a constrained being is not justified." The simple reply is that responsibility is an element in the complex perfect cause which connects Will with action, and being an element it cannot be said to be useless. Mullah Mahmood then goes on to elucidate the point further. Human nature has two faculties: one rational which inclines him to the spiritual and the other appetitive which leads him to the material. Now Will can be connected with any one of these two contradictory faculties, and on this conflict of inclinations has been placed responsibility. Religious and moral preachings help the Will to incline to virtue and shun vice. If on some occasions, Will does not incline to virtue owing to distortion of nature or indifference to religion and morals, this cannot be taken to wipe out responsibility. Religious responsibility could not be specified for sound hearts and right dispositions only for the moral and social structures do not allow this.

This section does not call for any comments, for the doctrines are not at all original, have since the third century A. H. been the common property of theologians, and have been vitiated by the use made in them of the old Faculty Psychology.

(c) *Reward and Punishment Not Justified.*

Closely connected with the question of responsibility is the question of rewards and punishments of the next life from the theological standpoint. Mullah Mahmood has said that action necessarily follows when will and choice get connected, and it cannot occur when this connection is absent, and that the determinative which causes this connection is external to man. The question then is: Why should man be punished for actions which do not lie totally in his power? He gives a reply which is found in the books of his predecessors like Ibn-i-Sina, Mir Baqar Damad, and some Tracts of Muhammad Al Ghazali. Punishment, he says, is not revenge inflicted by a spiteful God; but it is simply the necessary consequence of vice, just as bodily pains are the necessary consequences of disregarding laws of health.

(d) *Bodily Punishment Cannot be Explained.*

But it can be urged that religion speaks of material woes also, the snakes and scorpions which torment the sinner in the next world, and the above explanation does not hold good for this kind of punishment. Faced with this objection, Mullah Mahmood seems to waver in his statements. On the one hand he wants to become philosophical; but on the other hand he does not think fit to deny the material conception of punishment for which literal interpretations of numerous Traditions and verses of the Quran could be cited as an authority.

If we are to take the Traditions and Quranic verses *literally*, he says, we may *advocate as a probability* the doctrine that there *may* be some necessary connection between our sins and snakes and scorpions of the next world, which *we may not understand*. He then goes on to speak in the tone of a typical theologian, emphasises the incompleteness of human reason, and wants us to believe faithfully the information given by the Holy Prophet. Some Sufis, he adds, advocate that our very actions become represented and embodied as material objects of torture. In all this Mullah Mahmood shirks personal responsibility for the statements, and his sentences are full of phrases and words which emphasise doubt. It seems that he did not think it advisable to apply Logic to these articles of faith; but at the same time, being himself a free-minded man, did not fully endorse these as a thinker.

(e) *Forgiveness and Intercession cannot be Explained*. If, as has been said, woe and torture are necessarily connected with vice and sin, forgiveness and intercession can have no meaning; for necessary connection cannot be broken. This is the objection which Mullah Mahmood takes up next. He once again becomes philosophical and gives an admirable explanation of this theological point. He brushes aside the literal meaning of forgiveness and intercession and gives his own interpretation. In fact, he says, it is sin and vice only that cause

punishment and necessitate woe, so that the necessary connection is maintained and the effect follows the cause. Sometimes, owing to the absence of some necessary conditions, or the presence of other opposite factors, however, the effect does not follow, because the complete complex cause is not present or even gets destroyed owing to certain opposite factors. We do not always know these new factors and hence attribute the non-formation of the effect, or its obliteration after formation, to forgiveness of God, who is the ultimate cause of everything. The conception of forgiveness, therefore, according to Mullah Mahmood, is due to our inadequate knowledge, just as the conception of fate and chance are prevalent among those who cannot find out the hidden causes of things. Now, whenever the spirituality of the Prophet becomes one of these opposing factors and checks punishment, we speak of intercession.

In all this Mullah Mahmood is very interesting, and a good deal original. We appreciate his regard for the law of causality, and his broadmindedness in religion.

IV. Conclusion and Reference to Sufism. This brings us to the close of the small Tract, which Mullah Mahmood concludes with a graceful reference to Sufism. The remark is casual and meagre, probably intended simply to give a finishing touch to the Tract. But it reveals that Mullah Mah-

mood gave importance to the Sufi conception; and side by side with the logical conception of a cause he could think of the doctrine of one Unified Cause, embracing the whole universe within itself. Unfortunately, his *Risalat fi Wahdat Al Wujood* (Tract on Pantheism) is not extant, which must have been very interesting as it might have told us how Mullah Mahmood reconciled his Logic with his Sufism.

THE TRANSLATION

DETERMINISM AND FREEWILL

BY

MULLAH MAHMOOD JAUNPURI.

The Foreword of Hafiz Abid Husain.

In the name of Allah, the Lord of mercy, the Merciful.

All praise is due to Allah who is unified in His person, unique in His attributes, comprehends all attributes of perfection and is free from all shades of imperfections and deficiencies. He created the creation, and created them in the best way. Then He regulated their moods and behaviours, and illumined their sights and purified their hearts. He is Agent without any help or assistance, and an organiser without any thought or consideration. And the peace and blessings of Allah be on the Prophet, upto whom no noble-born comes in the field of greatness, and for whom no eulogy excels in the books of praise,—and also on his progeny and companions, who never swerved and sacrificed for Allah their lives and properties.

Now, Muhammad Abdullah, alias Abid Husain, who expects salvation from the preserver of the two worlds, and is needy before Allah, begs leave to say : I am a descendant of the leader of truth-seekers, and the head of researchers, the first of the foremost of the magnified, the last of philosophers, the prince of scholars, from the horizon

of whose expressions shone forth the light of Rhetoric, and from whose quill and finger-tips gushed forth streams of eloquence. He was the commander of the rhetoricians in his time, and the prince of the eloquent in his age. His honour stood high, and his place was lofty. He made brisk the market of philosophy and metaphysics after its dullness, and reformed it and expanded it. He laid the foundations of the metaphysical sciences, after their breakdown and fall, and purified and corrected them. It seems as if he received an inspiration with which he rejuvenated what had been dead. He was a man of noble breed and reputed excellence—our master, who knew the Quran by heart, *Al Haj* Mullah Mahmood of Jaunpur, the author of *Al Shams Al Bazigha* in philosophy, *Al Faraid* in rhetoric, and other books. May Allah let him relish the bliss of His forgiveness, and make him happy with the bliss of His grace and pleasure! The ancients among the philosophical thinkers, worked a good deal, acquired plenty of knowledge, wrote on scientific disciplines, elucidated problems of philosophy, coloured their grounds with researches, distributed their gifts after their deaths, and left their writings as a discourse for us. But (Mullah Mahmood) advanced much further than they in the field of sciences, though their last had been adjacent to them. He excelled so much in certain things that the wise declare when they hear of them—‘We never heard this

from Muslims: " Verily this is something wonderful ". It is not hidden to the man with sound natural faculties and matured rationality that all his books and writings are useful for students and rare in their discussions.

After a time, when I was helped by the auspicious days, I visited Allahabad, may Allah save it from trouble and degradation. There the Almighty Allah, after heart-rending labours, blessed me with his two Tracts: the first on Dogmatics, entitled *Matnun Mateen*, in Arabic; and the second on Determinism and Freewill, *Jabr-o-Ikhtiar* in Persian,—both useful for steady and pious hearts. I regarded them as a great boon, and praised Allah greatly for this, and thought that their great utility may be made general. Now adoration for Allah, and praise for Allah each morning and evening !

(The book of) the great Scholar, the wise Doctor, the Professor of his time, the Teacher of his age, the last of the philosophers, and the prince of the ancients, Mullah Mahmood of Jaunpur, may Allah cover him with merciful salvation, reads as follows :

The Epistle of Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri.

In the name of Allah, the Lord of mercy, the Merciful.

May the showers of Allah's munificence and the help of divine grace always keep the fruitful tree of your benevolent self's power and plenty, with its fruit and shade, as the source of world's decoration and adornment of man's soul!

The most humble servant, well-wishing and sincere, Mullah Mahmood of Jaunpur, has not as yet wiped off the dust of neglect from his confused countenance, nor the mist of shame from the forehead of his unfortunate times, for remissing the essentials of service with the bodily frame and the material form. Yet by way of sincerity and truth, he begs to offer with a sincere and sanguine heart, and in love and faithfulness, the dues of prayers and contributions of well-wishing. Then he requests those who have received permits from the court, which is the abode of fortune, and the assembly which is the haven of glory, that they should write a letter from the devoted servants to the august lord. If its object is to make any requests or to transmit any news, they should do it moderately and candidly and should avoid trouble and tediousness. But if they have got nothing to say other than to remember themselves to the high personality, it is proper that they should seek introduction

by writing a suitable Tract, the writing and presenting of which may be acceptable to the nature which is scholarly and the temperament which digests truth and partakes of reality.

Accordingly, this well-wisher does not see anything befitting himself and suitable for the great court other than a scientific and philosophical discourse. He, therefore, begs to present an extremely condensed Tract, written in an interesting and refreshing style, which should discuss Determinism and Free Will,—one of the most difficult problems on account of equally strong conflicting arguments. I warrant that uptil the present time none of the learned doctors has spoken with so much subtlety and truth in elucidating and purifying this rare subject and uncommon topic: nor has any one cleared away so well thorn and straw of doubt and fancy from the path of argument and way of belief. And with Allah is help, and in His hands is correspondence of reality!

Determinism and Freewill by Mullah Mahmood Jaunpuri.*

The Intuitive Background. Let it not be hidden from the thoughts of men with insight that the intuitive reason is the right judge and the true witness for the fact that deliberate actions, like eating, sleeping, binding and going, have a kind of relation and a special connection with our power and Will : as against the natural actions of minerals, like centripetal and centrifugal forces, and the mechanical movements of animals,—in the first of which power and volition are absent, and in the second, although volition is present, its relation (with power) is absent.

The Mu'tazilite View. These facts being as they are, the Mu'tazilites have limited their attention to them. They have imagined that man and all animals are absolutely free and fully empowered

*The present writer believes in a translation which should give a full idea of the original, and hence a closely literal translation has been made and even the constructions of phrases and sentences in the original have been retained so far as it has been possible to do so without violence to English grammar and idiom. The original is very condensed, and hence the translation may also be found aphoristic and tedious. The difficulties, however can be solved by a reference to the Introduction. The division of sections and the sectional headings are not present in the original, which is a continuous reading. They have been introduced by the translator.

in deliberate actions and willed movements : if they wish they act, if they do not wish they do not act. Neither their doing these acts is compulsory, nor their not doing them comes upto necessity. The rightful Creator and the omnipotent Lord has given authority to man, and put the reins of power into his hands. Then He has prescribed for him noble habits and virtuous actions, and forbidden him ignoble habits and vicious practices. As the reward of virtue, He has promised the pleasures of the next world ; and for the punishment of vice, He has ordained woes of after-life. Hence, if one takes up the way of obedience with choice and deliberation, one is blessed with the happiness of the next world ; but if one accepts the path of vice with power and Will, one is overwhelmed with damnation. After relating power and Will in man, the Will and Power of God have no connection whatsoever with actions of man, and there is no compulsion and determination for them. Owing to independence in power and choice, man is subject to reward and punishment in actions and habits, accordingly as they are virtuous and vicious—divine commands or prohibitions.

Mullah Mahmood's Creed. Truth-seekers have seen unveiled further than this with their rational eyes. Man, (they say), has determined freedom and constrained volition; his actions are voluntary, but his will is restrained. Now, the actions of man, because of their contingency, stand

in need of a cause, which may be his power and will, or rather the connection between his power and will. As the connection between power and volition is possible, not necessary, permissible and not imperative; therefore necessarily it stands in need of a determinative which should give preference to its being over non-being; and, to escape infinite regress, this determinative should terminate in something outside man's power and volition, but bound and connected with God's power and will. Anybody who would subject the system of universe to a keen observation and would ascend from the lower to the higher and from the secondary to the primary, will become convinced of the fact that the last of this system is related to its first, and the end of this chain is bound to its beginning. This being so, whenever our power and will and choice get connected with an action, the action becomes necessary, notwithstanding all causes and conditions, otherwise the effect will break away from its cause. But when this connection is not present, the action becomes impossible, otherwise the possible will become free from cause. Similarly the connection between power and will is necessary when its cause is present, but impossible when its cause is absent.

Objections and Their Replies.

(1) *Will Requires No Determinative.* Some hold the view that will is the faculty which gives preference to one of the two equals without any

determinative, so that each of the two equals, like sitting and standing, can be preferred to the other without a third determinative.

Reply. In my opinion, if will may be related to one of the two equals as well as with the other, its being related with the one and not with the other will be getting preference of one of the two equals without any determinative. In other words, if the relation of will with one alternative and the absence of this relation are both equal, the presence of this relation, and not its absence, will be preference without a determinative. Will itself cannot be a determinative for this relation, because will is a determinative for the thing with which it is related, and we have the relation itself under discussion. If it is urged that another act of will may have got related by virtue of the relation of this act of will, any discussion on this second act of volition will be drawn into either argument in a circle or infinite regress. He, who permits preference without a determinative in voluntary actions, and exempts this from the universal proposition for the inadmissibility of preference without a determinative, is not worthy to be addressed; because exceptions of this class can be current in conventional laws and linguistic terminology, but not in universal, rational, necessary laws. It has, therefore, been laid down in philosophy that everything is crowned with necessity at the time of existence, and wears the garb of impossibility in the event of disexistence.

Everything that has been honoured with the garb of existence has been illumined with a spark of the light of necessity; and the purely possible lies by the side of the impossible in the void of non-being. The equality of the two phases of the possible, although rationally a fact, is a fiction as an objective reality.

(2) *Constrained Freedom Should Bear No Responsibility.* The following may be urged against this position: On the basis of these principles, responsibility will be meaningless, the sending of prophets and revelation of books will be unwise, and the discourse of scholars and advice of philosophers will be impolitic. Because when the perfect cause of the relation of man's volition with action (which cause is outside his will) is present, the volition of man will necessarily get connected with action; and it will not be possible to prevent him from it by prohibition and rebuke. When, however, this perfect cause is not present, the formation of the relation of volition and the occurrence of action will be impossible; and it would not be possible to persuade man to it by order or allurements. The substance of the statement is that although man is free in his actions, his freedom is bound with constraint, and the responsibility of a constrained being is not justifiable.

Reply. Against the above I should say that the relation of will with action is one among many incomplete causes. When it gets combined with other

causes and conditions, it becomes the foundation of the relation of will and action. Even if on some occasions (like the responsibility of Abu Jihl* for faith), the effect is not formed owing to the other causes not being combined and the presence of obstructions, it does not mean that the actual responsibility is meaningless.

Further Exposition of Mullah Mahmood's Creed.

The real facts are these. The glorious Lord, by virtue of His eternal wisdom, has endowed the nature of man, (who is an epitome of the universe, and the best in the book of wisdom and insight) with the faculties of knowledge and cognition, which direct him towards the All-powerful and separate him from material defilements. He has also given him the capacities of anger and desire, which cause pre-occupation with brute actions and animal practices. Then, by endowing him with power and will, which have the capacity of being related to any one of the two contradictories, God has placed man in the midst of struggle and strife. Man thus has a connection with the Ten Intelligences and angels, as well as an attraction for the class of brutes and beasts; and on this struggle and strife the foundation of responsibility has been laid. By sending

* The name of Abu Jihl stands for a typical religious and moral wreck who has become fixed in vice and cannot be rectified.—[Translator].

apostles and revealing books, God had separated the path of virtue from the way of vice, ordering the one and forbidding the other ; so that with the help of knowledge and the study of the signs of Apostleship striving for God should capture the heart and should make the desire for virtue, which is inspiration from the Lord of Mercy, overcome the causes of vice, which are the promptings of the devil, and the recitation of the divine revelation and God's commandments should excite the Will to obey divine orders and to shun vice. All this combined together will become a cause for the virtuous action which will then shoot forth from potentiality into actuality ; while the vicious action will be veiled and hidden with disexistence in the secret cell of potentiality. If, on some occasions, owing to lack of attention to the divine signs and consideration of the clear evidences, or owing to perversion of disposition or inversion of nature, the words of the divine Law-giver are not approved; or, in spite of approval, the Will for doing the virtuous and avoiding the vicious is not excited owing to the mastery of the power of anger and appetite because of natural inclination or custom and habit,—even then man's responsibility as such will not be removed. For instance rain is according to wisdom and policy ; but it is of no use for the barren soil. A little consideration will make it plain to the wise that had the divine Law-giver specified responsibility only for sound hearts and right dispositions, the system of divine law

would break down, and the work of preachers like prophets, Imams, and doctors of religion, would become tedious. Also indifference for religion would overcome human nature, and most of the objects and aims which have been intertwined with the religious law, would be deprived of system and order.

Supplementary Objections and their Replies.

(3). *Reward and Punishment Not Justified.* It may be urged that according to what has been laid down, punishment and damnation would be simple tyranny and sheer oppression.

Reply. In my opinion, punishment is not really what it apparently seems to be, that God takes revenge upon the sinner for his vice and sin. Rather the sinner is like a sick man, the sins are like diets which produce impure chyme, the forms which are impressed on the heart by sins are like adulterated humours, and the Absolutely Wise, for Whom there are far better analogies, is like a physician. Now, just as pain and sickness result from unhealthy organic changes and disregard of the physician's directions, without the physician having taken any revenge upon the patient or borne any spite for him, similarly the woes of the next world result when divine orders are not obeyed, without any spite or tyranny on the part of God. "We did not oppress them, but they have oppressed themselves".*

* This is a verse of the Quran.—[Translator].

(4) *Bodily Punishment Cannot be Explained.* It may be urged that all this can be rationally understood only in case of spiritual punishment, as for instance the love of the world necessitates that its separation should be painful; but in bodily punishment, of which the true religion speaks, it is very difficult to comprehend this doctrine and submit to it; because the punishment by snakes and scorpions and fetters for discarding virtue and accepting vice can in no way be understood.

Reply. In my opinion if, according to the sound method of the doctors of religion and divines of Islam, we take definite statements proving bodily punishments according to their literal meaning and do not attribute meanings to the expressions by analogy and symbolism, it may be possible that there is a necessary connection, not known or comprehended by our imperfect reasons, between the vicious actions which take place in this world, and the snakes and scorpions of the other world; because it is not necessary that the cause of all that is true in itself may be known to us. "You have not been given of knowledge, but a little."* It may be possible that scorpions are the property of vicious actions just as attracting iron is the property of magnetism. The faithful believes in it by testifying to the message of the Prophet, and the scholar is convinced of it through knowledge and experience. Whosoever nods to Hippocrates and Galen in the properties of medicines and herbs without

* This is a verse of the Quran.—[Translator].

knowing the causes, but does not accept, Muhammad, the Elect, on whom be the peace and blessings of Allah, in the properties of actions without enquiring into the reasons for necessary connections, is certainly many stages away from faith. A group of intuitionists are of the view that these very actions are represented and embodied as appropriate stages, in the Hades. "And verily these are your own actions which are returned to you."* It is mentioned in the Traditions—"Adoration for Allah and praise for Allah, the decorator of paradise."

(5) *Forgiveness and Intercession Cannot be Explained.* It may be urged that according to the doctrine which has been accepted forgiveness will have no place and intercession will be of no avail; because, when pain is a necessary result of vice and separation of cause from effect is impossible, how can forgiveness be possible and intercession advantageous?

Reply. In my opinion, really the cause of pain and punishment is an unhealthy form which is impressed on the soul by vice. The impression of this form has its conditions and interdicts, and it is possible that on certain occasion, inspite of vice, the unhealthy form may not be impressed owing to the absence of certain conditions or the presence of some interdicts. It may even be that after being impressed the form may be obliterated and wiped out by the introduction of its opposite. As the absence of conditions and the presence of interdicts

* This is a verse of the Quran.—[Translator].

are not comprehended by the individual reason owing to rareness, secrecy, and unintelligibility, it has been called the forgiveness of God, with Whom is the end and aim of everything, just as the secret, rare causes are termed fate and chance. When, however, the fulness of belief in apostleship and help from the spirituality of the Prophet check the impression of the form, it is spoken of as intercession.

Conclusion and Reference to Sufism.

It should be noted that what has been spoken of about the gradation of causes, and their final ending in the Will of God, is from the standpoint of the man whose view is too narrow for taking into one span the whole system (of universe), and does not go beyond the intermediate causes and effects. But the rational eye of the man whose view has expanse enough to comprehend the whole world of existence does not fix upon any cause from one end of eternity to the other excepting the One Cause from the munificence of whose holy self he has come out of the defilement of possibility, and received the bliss of existence or even necessity, and he does not see any cause other than the cause of causes.

Eye for hidden cause should penetrate

To unearth cause from root and branch.

He (Allah) is first and last and manifest and hidden. Now peace be on you !

THE INDEX.

INDEX

[This index includes only proper names of persons, places and books. Book-titles are printed in italics. The numerals referring to the pages of the English text are printed in the ordinary type, those to footnotes in italics, and those to the Persian text in thick type.]

- Abbasides 10, 11, 71, 73
Abbaside Kingdom 10
Abd-al-Baqi 3, 13, 38
Abd-al-Hai (Muhammad, Maulavi) 14, 54, 55, 59
Abd-al-Hakeem (Muhammad) 30, 31, 37
Abd-al-Rashid (Mullah) 16, 35
Abd-al-Razzaq Lahiji (Mullah) 83, **23**
Abd-al-Sattar (Mullah) 35, 36, 38
Abd-al-Sayeed (Mullah) 16, 35
Abdul Hadi (Shah) 35
Abdul Haq (Shah) 35
Abdullah 15
Abdullah (Ibn Umar) 15
Abd-al-Subhan (Mullah) 35
Abdul Wahhab 73.
Abid Husain (Muhammad Abdullah, Hafiz) **3**, 25, 30, 37, 35, 36, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 91
Abid Husain (Mufti) 25
Abu Hanifa **9**, 73
Abu Jihl **25**, 101
Abul Baqa **31**
Abul Fath 15

Abul Hasan (Al Ashari) **9, 30, 73**
 Abul Khair (Haji) 13, 15, 19, 35, 36
 Abu Sayeed (Makhdoom Shaikh) 35
Al Adab Al Baqia Wal Abhas Al Baqia 3, 13, 38
 Adhd-al-Deen (Qadhi) 46
 Afdhal (Mullah, Shaikh Muhammad, of Rodauli) 20,
 21, 22, 23, 28, 35, 36, 42
 Afdhal (Shaikh Muhammad, of Allahabad) 23
 Afghanistan 17
Al Fiqh Al Akbar **9**
 Agra 4, 6, 7
 Ahmad (Maulavi Shaikh, Sarhindi) 37
 Akbar (the Great Mughal) 4, 6, 7, 9, 73
 Akbarabad 22, 24, 27, 57
 Alauddin (Khilji) 18
 Aligarh 22
 Allahabad 4, 12, 60, 61
Amal-i-Salih 12, 38
 Arabia 4, 6, 7
 Aristotle 10
 Aryan 14
 Asharites **9, 11, 13, 29**, 58, 63, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79
 Asif Khan 24, 57, 58, 62
 Athens 10
 Aurangzib 39, 58
 Averoes (See Ibn Rushd)
 Avicenna (See Ibn Sina)
Ayoon-al-Masail **15, 26**
 Azad Bilgrami 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 28, 33, 37, 38,
 46, 46, 59
 Azamgarh 19, 19
 Azd-al-Deen Muhammad (Sultan) 15, 18
Badshahnama 12

Baghdad 9, 10, 17, 39, 40, 41, 42
 Bahlol (Lodi) 3, 9
 Balkh 27
 Baqir (Mir, Damad) **13**, 25, 26, **29**, 32, 55, 85
 Barabanki 23
 Basra 10, 17, 39
 Bhira (Bahira) 19
 Bilauchtola 31, 32
 Bukhara 41
 Chachakpur 28, 29, 31
 Chand (Muhammad, Shaikh) 16
 Chengiz Khan 15, 17
 Clarke 77
 Damavand 23
 Dara Shikoh 7
 Darwin 10
Al Dauhat Al Mayadat 48, 49, 53
 Delhi 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18
Determinism and Free will 34, 36, 56, 89, 95, 96
 Dowsen 3
 Egypt 8
Eiqazat **13**
 Elliot 3
 Erdmann 77
 Fakhr-al-Deen (of Rai) **13**, **20**, 71
 Al Farabi **7**, **11**, **13**, **14**, **15**, **17**, **26**, 66, 68, 71, 76
Al Faraid **4**, 24, 45, 47, 63, 92
 Farrukh Shah (Ahmad, Sultan) 15, 16, 17
 Fasihuddin (Maulavi, K. B.) 25, 28, 29, 29, 30, 32
 Fatimids (of Egypt) 8
Al Fawaid Al Ghayasia **4**, 6
 Firishta 3
Fi Aqsam-i-Niswan 55

Al Fusool (Kitab) **13**
Fusooos al Hikam **13, 14, 23**
 Galen 105
Ganj-i-Rashidi 14
Gauhar-i-Murad **23**
 Gayas-al-Deen Muhammad (Sultan) 16, 18
Gazetteer (The United Provinces) 3, 30
 Al Ghazali (Muhammad) 71, 85, **29**
 Ghazipur 23, 60
 Ghulam Farid (Shah) 35
 Gomti 1, 4, 29
 Greece 10, 11
Gulshan-i-Ibrahimi 3
Gulshan-i-Raz **25**
 Hadi (Muhammad) 22
 Hamid (Mullah) 16, 35
 Hamilton 77.
 Hamza (Shaikh, Mufti) 23, 42
 Hanafite 34, 72
Al Hikmat al Baligha 47
 Al Hilli (Shaikh Mutahhar) **13**
 Hippocrates 105
 Hisham (Ibn-al-Hakam) **13**
History of Islamic Philosophy 39, 71
 Homer 55
 Husain (Sultan Sharqi) 3, 8, 18
Al Ibanat **9**
 Ibn Khaldun 8
 Ibn Miskawayh 71
 Ibn Rushd (Avercœs) 8, 71
 Ibn Sina (Avicenna) **13, 17, 18, 21, 26, 29.** 40, 41,
 43, 44, 53, 71, 82, 85

Ibraheem 15.
Al Ikhwan Al Safa (Risail) **26**
 Imamia 15 (See Shiates and Twelvers)
 Imam Salim (See Nasir-al-Deen)
 Iraq 4, 6, 7, 25, **4**
 Ishaq (Imam) 15
 Ismail (Makhdoom Shah) 35
Jabr-o-Ikhtiar (Risalah) **1, 5, 9, 49, 51, 55, 59, 93, 107**
 Jafar Al Sadiq (Imam) **13**
 Jahangir 22, 74, 75
 Jaunpur 1, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29
 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39
Jaunpur-nama 3, 14, 17, 19, 19, 20, 20, 23, 24, 28, 28,
 29, 30, 32
 Jundishapur 40
 Justinian 40
 Kabul 15, 17, 18, **4**
 Khadim Ali (Shah) 35
 Khidhr (Makhdoom Shaikh) 16, 35
 Khidhr (Muhammad, Shaikh, Maulavi) 16, 36
 Khilji (Alauddin) 18
 Alkindi 71
Kitab Al Aqid **13**
Kitab Al Aqeda **13**
Kitab Al Arbain **13**
Kitab Al Faidhan 13, 14, 16
Kitab Al Imali **13**
Kitab Al Tawheed (of Abdul Wahhab) **10**
Kitab Al Tawheed (of Shaikh Sadooq) **13**
Kitab Al Wasiyat **9**
Al Kulliat **31**
 Lahore 4, 6, 7, 74

Leibniz 77.

Maasir Al Kiram 14, 21, 24, 27, 38, 55, 59

Mah (Shaikh Muhammad) 16

Mahamid (Shaikh, *Muhallah*) 24

Mahmood (Sultan or Shah?) 29

Mahmood (Mullah) 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49,
50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68,
69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 101,
1, 4, 5, 6

Ma'roof I (Muhammad Shaikh) 16

Ma'roof II (Muhammad Shaikh) 16, 18, 19, 34, 35, 36

Al Masail Al Falsafia **8, 11**

Masud (Saiyid Salar, Ghazi) 2

Masud 15

Mathnawi (Maulana Rumi) 23

Matnun Mateen **5**, 34, 55, 93

Mazindran 23, 42

Mecca 10, 17, 25, 33, 42

Medina 17, 39, 42

Al Milal wal Nahl **11**

Minhaj Al Salah **13**

Mir'aj Al Uqool 60, 61

Mittupura 30, 31

Mongols 9

Moors 8

Mufeed (Shaikh) **13**

Mughalsarai 1

Muhammad (Makhdoom, Shaikh) 16, 18

Muhammad (Shah, *alias* Shaikh Barhe) 16, 17, 19, 20,
23, 35, 42

Muhammad (Shaikh) 16, 35
 Muhammad (Shah) 35, 55
 Muhammadabad 19
Al Muhassal 13, 20
 Mukarram (Ahmad, Maulavi) 13
 Murtadha (Muhammad, Saiyid) 60, 61
 Murtadha (Saiyid) 13
 Musshayyad (Makhdoom Shaikh) 16, 18
 Musa (Muhammad, Maulavi Shah) 30, 35
 Mutazilites 63, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 96, **10, 11,**
 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21
 Nasir-al-Deen (Imam Salim) 15, 42
 Nasir-al-Deen (of Tus) 71, **13, 18**
Al Najat 43, **21**
 Neville (H. R.) 30
 Nizam-al-Deen (Khwaja) 3
 Nizami (Budauni) 14, 20, 29, 32
 Nizam-al-Deen Sahalvi (Mullah) 48
 Noor-al-Deen (Maulavi) 14, 19, 28
 Noor Allah (Qadhi, of Shoostar) 74
 Numan Shah I (Sultan) 15
 Numan Shah II (Sultan) 15, 16
 Othman (Caliph) 23
 Oudh 23
 Persia 4, 6, 7, 15, 25, 26, 40, 42, 45, 55, 58, 62, **4**
 Plato 55, **26**
 Poona 66
 Pythagoreans **26**
Qamoos-al-Mashaheer 14, 20, 20, 29
 Quran 7, 24, 40, 70, 75, 79, 85, 92
 Rahman Ali 14, 17, 20, 23, 23, 38
 Rahmat Ilahis 4
 Rai 71

Ram Chandra (Sri) 2
 Reid 77
Review of Philosophy and Religion 66
Risala Khalq-i-A'mal **13**
Risalat fi Tahqiq Al Kulli Wal Juzai 49, 53, 54
Risalat fi Tahqiq Irtifa Al Naqidhain 49, 54
Risalat fi Wahdat Al Wujood 55, 88
 Rodauli 23, 42
 Saad-al-Deen 71
Sabhat-al-Marjan 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 28, 33,
 37, 38, 46, 59.
 Sadiq (Muhammad) 13, 22, 24, 38
 Sadooq (Shaikh) **13**
 Sadr-al-Deen (of Shiraz) 26
 Saiyidpur 23
 Salih (Mullah) 12, 38
 Salim (Imam) See Nasir-al-Deen
 Satyapir 8
 Semetic 14
 Shahjahan 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 24, 27, 30, 38, 45, 56,
 57, 62
Shahjahannama 12
 Shahristani (Abdul Karim) **11**
 Shah Shuja 24, 38
Al Shams Al Bazigha 14, 21, 26, 27, 33, 34, 43, 45,
 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 59, 61, 76, 92, **4**
 Sharqi (Kingdom) 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, 25, 28
 Shayista Khan 24, 45, 56, 57, 58
Sheer-o-Shakar 13, 15, 16, 19, 36
 Sher Shah 2
 Shiates 10, 72, **15**
Al-Shifa 43, 53, **13**
 Shiraz (of India) 2, 6, 26

Shoostar 72
 Sipah (*Muhallah*) 28, 30, 31, 32
 Siraj-al-Deen (Muhammad, Mullah) 35
 Socrates 10
 Spain 8
Subh-i-Sadiq 13, 24, 38
 Sulaiman Shah (Sultan) 15, 16, 17
 Sulaiman (Muhammad, the Hon'ble Dr. Sir Shah) 12,
 13, 30, 35, 36, 61
 Syed (Sir Ahmad, Khan) 22
Tabaqat-i-Akbari 3
Tadhkira 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 38, 59
Tadhkira-i-Ghausia 13, 14, 15
Tadhkira-i-Mashaheer-i-Jaunpur 14
Tadhkira-i-Ulama-i-Hind 14, 17
Tafseer-i-Kabeer 13
 Taj-al-Deen (Muhammad, Sultan) 15, 18
Tajalli-i-Noor 14
Tajrid-al-Kalam 13
Taliqat 13
Talkhis-al-Muhassal 13, 19
Timacus 26
 Timurlane 16, 18
Tisa Risail fil Hikmat 17
 Tons (River) 19
 Turkistan 40
 Tus 71
Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri 22, 22
 Twelvers (The) 70, 72, 79, 15 (See Shiates)
 Umar (Caliph) 14, 15, 17
Upanishads 7
 Uthman (Shaikh) 16
 Uthman (Shaikh Muhammad, Maulavi) 35, 36

Wafiat-al-Alam 14
Waiz-al-Akbar 15
Waiz-al-Asghar 15
Wajid (Muhammad, Shah) 35
Walidpur 16, 18, 19, 23, 34
Walipur 18
Yezdgurd 14, 15
Yoosuf (Muhammad, Mullah) 35
Zafarabad 1, 29

RISALA JABR-O-IKHTIAR

OF

MULLAH MAHMOOD JAUNPURI

(THE ORIGINAL PERSIAN)

WITH FULL EXPLANATORY, CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE
NOTE IN PERSIAN AND ARABIC

BY

ALI MAHDI KHAN, M. A.

اور برکات ائبر پچیس آتہ آباد۔ بانتھام سید اکبر علی مالک مطبع طبع شد۔

)

از جزئیات معلولات و علل عبور نہ نماید۔ اما ہر کہ دیدارِ او را گنجایش
 احاطہ کلّ عالم^(۱) وجود بود، در نظر شہودش از ازل تا ابد جز یک
 معلول، کہ با قاضی علین مقدرہ، از شوائب امکان، بخشش
 وجود بل وجوب، یافتہ، مسبب و معلول ملحوظ نہ بود۔ و چہ
 مسبب الاسباب علت و سبب نہ۔^(۲)

دیدہ باید از سبب سوراخ کن

تا سببها بر کند از پنج و بن

ہو الاول والاخر والظاهر والباطن، والسلام

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| (۱) چشم آن باشد کہ نہ فلک را بیند۔ | چشمی کہ بہ نور مہربیند کو راست |
| (۲) عالم اثر است ذات یکتائی را | روزے کہ درو نہ آفتاب است کہ دید |
| سبحان اللہ حیرتے دارم سخت | زان دیدہ کہ ذرہ دید و غورشید نہ دید |

بعض موانع، هیئتِ ردیه حاصل نه شود. و باشد، که بعد از حصول، به سببِ طریائی^(۱) ضدِ غنقی^(۲) و منغی^(۳) گردد. و چون فقدانِ شرایطِ باوجودِ موانع، به سببِ ندرت و خفا و عدمِ انضباط، محاطِ عقولِ جزیه نبود، از ان بعفو حق تعالی، که مرجع و مقتهائِ امور بدست، تعبیر واقع شد. چنانکه از اسبابِ خفیه نادره، به نجت و اتفاق تعبیر کنند. و آن جا که مانع از رسوخِ هیئت کمالِ اعتقاد بر نبوت، و استمرار از روحانیت نبی باشد، به شفاعت بر آن اشارت نمایند.^(۴)

و پوشیده مباد، که آنچه از ترتبِ اسباب خاتمه بر اشارت { و انتهای آن به بمشیتِ رب الارباب (۵) به مسلکِ تصوف } مذکور شد، در نظر کسی است، که حدقه بصیرتش از ملاحظه نظامِ جملی بیک دفعه تنگی نموده، نظرش

(۱) طاری شدن -

(۲) لغی کرده شده -

(۳) محو کرده شده -

(۴) پس معلوم شد که در نظر مصنف علام شفاعت ظاهری که بران احادیث متعدده

مشعرست هیچ معنی ندارد -

(۵) این است افتخارِ بلیغ که بغایت حسن و خوبی در آخر رساله ثبت کرده شده است مسلک صوفیه آنست که جز علت العلل و سبب الارباب هیچ علتی و سببی موجود نیست -

وَأَتِمَّاهِيَ أَعْمَالَكُمْ رِيْذُ عَلَيْكُمْ - و در خبر آمده سُبْحَانَ اللَّهِ
والحمد لله اعراض الجنة

اگر گوئی^(۲) بنابر آنچه اختیار نمودی، عفو را
مسئله عفو عذاب { گنجایش نباشد و شفاعت مفید نه بود
چه هرگاه الم لازم عصیان باشد، و انفکاک لازم از ملزوم
مستحيل^(۳) بود، عفو چه گونه صورت بندد، و شفاعت چه
فائده دهد -

گویم به حقیقت موجب الم و مقتضی
جواب مصنف علام { عقاب، سهیئت رویه است که در
نفس بسبب عصیان راسخ می گردد، و رسوخ این سهیئت
را شرایط و موانع است - و تواند بود که در بعضی محل،
با وجود عصیان، به سبب فقدان بعضی شرایط، یا وجود

(۱) این آیت قرآنی است که بدان متصوفه استدلال کنند بر مسلک خود
درین مسئله -

(۲) در مسئله عفو مصنف علام مختار خود بنهیجی بیان نموده اگر چه تصریح آن نه فرمود -
عفو در نظرش حقیقتی ندارد و چون علل و اسباب معلوم نمی شود تبیین
بر آن لفظ شود - و الا رافع عذاب را علتی است که متعلق به اعمال عباد
می باشد -

(۳) محال و غیر ممکن -

حیات و عقارب خاصیت اعمال سیئہ بود۔ و مومن آن را
 بہ تصدیقِ خبرِ نبوت اعتقاد کند، و محققِ کشف و شہودِ ایقان
 نماید۔ و ہر کہ بقراط و جالینوس را در خواصِ ادویہ و عقاقیر بے
 ادراکِ لم آن تصدیقِ نماید، و محمد مصطفیٰ صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ
 وسلم را، در خواصِ اعمالِ بے دریافت و جہہ لزوم،
 تصدیق نہ کند، همانا کہ از ایمان بہ مراحلِ دورِ خواہد بود۔
 و جمعے از اربابِ شہودِ (۱۲) بر آئند،
 مسلکِ اربابِ شہودِ در { کہ ہمیں اعمالِ در یزخِ شلِ بصورہ
 ثواب و عقابِ جسمانی } مناسبہ متخیل و متجسد می گردد۔

(۱) معلوم می شود کہ مصنفِ علام در علم طب شغف نہ داشت زیرا کہ بر تالیسین آن علم ظاہر است
 کہ طبیب بر بقراط و جالینوس در خواصِ ادویہ و عقاقیر بے ادراکِ لم آن
 ایمان نمی آورد بلکہ خاصیت ہر دوا را بہ تجربہ و استدلالِ متیقن و متحقق
 می کند۔

(۲) ”مرحلۃ جائے فرود آمدن۔ مراحلِ جمع“ صراح۔ پس مراحلِ معنی
 منازلِ خواہد شد۔

(۳) یعنی اشراقین و متصوفین۔ مصنفِ علام ذکر ہر دینی علمائے شریعت
 و علمائے طریقت کردہ و مختار خود را بیان نہ فرمودہ۔ ممکن است کہ او
 را در اختیار ہر یکے ازین دو قول تذبذب بودہ باشد۔ و یا مصلحتِ وقتی
 مناسب نہ بودہ کہ مختار خود را صراحتاً بیان کند۔

و تمثیل معانی بصور حل نکنیم، چنانکه طریقه سلیمه علماء شریعت و ائمه ملت است، تواند بود که در میان اعمال سیئه، که درین موطن بوقوع آید، و میان حیات و عقاب، که دران نشاء مترتب گردد، و چه^(۲) از لزوم بود، که بدرک و محاط عقول ناقصه مانده شود - چه لازم نیست که هر چه در نفس الامر متحقق شود، لم آن بر^(۳) ما منکشف باشد - وَمَا أُوتِيتُمْ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ إِلَّا قَلِيلًا تواند بود که، همچنانکه جذب آهن خاصیت مقناطیس است،

(بقیه صفحہ ۳۰) دلالت کند - به ظاہر معلوم می شود که چون این دو مسئلہ متعلق به عقاید بود مصنف علام مصلحتاً از شاهراہ بحث حکمت و فلسفہ به گوشه اثبات احکام شریعت پناه گزین شد و برای طلاب حکمت و فلسفہ تنبیہ بلیغ بگذاشت -

ها قال ابوالبقاء فی کلیات النقص اصله ان یعدی بنفسه لان مغناه الرفع الرفع البالغ ثم نقل فی الاصلاح الی الکتاب والسنه والی ما لا یحتصل الامعنی واحد او ما لا یحتمل التادیل -
(۱) چنانکه طریقه فلاسفہ و حکماء و متصوفه است -

(۲) مصنف علام این وجه را واضح نه کرده و نه هیچ استدلال بران قائم نموده - پس صراحتاً گفته که این قول در عقل نمی آید و بران اعتقاد باید کرد -

(۳) یعنی لازم نیست که هر امر که فی نفسه صدق و حق باشد بر عقل منفرد نیز منکشف گردد - درین مقام مصنف بنا بر استدلال بر نقص عقل انسانی نهاده که خلاف طریقه حکماء است -

متفرع می گردد بے آنکه طبیب در حق مریض استغناء کشیده
و حقدی گرفته باشد، بر همان پنج آلام اخروی، بر عدم آتش
احکام الهی مترتب می شود، بے آنکه حق تعالی کینه کشیده باشد
و طلبه خواسته - و ما ظلمناهم و لکن كانوا انفسهم ناطلون -

اگر گوی که این در عقاب ردحانی متعقل
ایجاب ثواب و کی می گردد، چه دنیا مثلاً مستنزم آن ست
عقاب جسمانی که مفارقتش موالم بود - لیکن در عقاب
جسمانی، که شریعت حقه به آن ناطق است، ادراک و اذعان
این معنی بنهایت مشکل است، زیرا که لزوم حیات^(۳) و عقارب
و سلاسل، بر ترک او امر و اتیان مناهی، بیچ وجه مدرک
نمی شود -

گویی، بر تقدیر یکیه نصوص^(۴) داکه بر ثواب
جواب مصنف علام { و عقاب جسمانی را، بطا هر گذاشته، بر تمثیل

(۱) کینه و بغض -

(۲) یعنی عقاب که اشیاء و امور موالم در آن مجسم و تجسد نمی شود -

(۳) آنچه از اخبار و احادیث مستنبط می شود همین ست که در قبر بارها و عقربها
ما صی را می گیرند و او را از آهمن و زنجیر عقوبت داده می شود -

(۴) ازین مقام تا آخر رساله مصنف علام در اقوال خود شک است چنانکه
مکرار الفاظ "بر تقدیر یکیه" - "و تواند بود" - "باشد" و استعمال صیغه افعال

رفع اشکالات

ایجابِ ثواب و عقاب { و اگر گوئی، که بنا بر آنچه مقرر شده، عذاب و عقاب، جورِ محض، و ظلمِ بحت بود -

جوابِ مصنفِ علام { گوئیم که، حقیقتِ عذاب نه ان است، که در بادی النظرِ مدرک می شود، که حق تعالی از عاصی، به سببِ عصیان و طغیان، انتقام می کشد -

بلکه عاصی بمنزلهٔ مریض است، و معاصی بمنزلهٔ اغذیهٔ فاسدهٔ الکیموس^(۱)، و بهداشتی، که از عصیان در دل مرتسم می گردد؛ بشایهٔ اخلاطِ ردیه، و حکیم علی الاطلاق، و لاملثل الا علی، بمنزلهٔ طبیب - همچنان که وجع و ألم به تدبیرِ فاسد و مخالفتِ قولِ طبیب

(۱) درین دو مسئله در آخر کتاب یعنی مسئله ایجابِ ثواب و عقاب و مسئله عفو عذابِ مصنفِ علام کل مطالب عالیه را از کتب شیخ الرئيس و میر باقر داماد و بعض رسائل امام غزالی اخذ نموده است و هیچ تفرد و تجدد را اختیار نکرده - و بر دو اتفاق علم کلام واضح است که این مطالب از عقاید اشعریه مبانیست کلی دارد -

(۲) «الکیموس الخلط سربانیة» (ص ۱۸۰) - «الکیموس الخلط والحالة

التي يكون عليها الطحار بعد فعل المعذبة فيه - معترس

خیموس بالیونانیة» - (محیط المحيط صفحہ ۱۹۴) - درین اختلاف

صراح غلط است زیرا که کیموس لفظ یونانی است -

در حرکت نیاید، مستلزم استدراک مطلق تکلیف نخواهد بود۔
چنانکه بارش منیع بر طبق حکمت و قانونِ مصلحت است،
هر چند در شوبه زار منفعت نه کند۔ و بر اربابِ فطانت باندگس
تامل هویدای می گردد، که اگر تکلیفِ شارع به قلوبِ سلیمه و قرائحِ
مستقیمه مخصوص بود، نظامِ ناموس^(۱) گسیخته گشته، و کار
بر اربابِ دعوات، از انبیاء و ائمّه و علماء و مجتهدین امت بصحبت
انجامید۔ و تهاون بدین بر طبایع استیلا یافته۔ و اکثر
مصلح و حکم، که به شرع باز بسته است، از انتساق و انتظام
بر افتاده۔

(رقیہ حاشیہ صفحہ ۲۴) (۴) الف خو گرفتن و دوستی گرفتن یکے و بجائے
الف بالکسر دوستی (صراح)۔

(۱) زیرا که در غلبه دادنِ قوائے شہوانیہ و مقرر کردنِ عادت بنده
مختار بود۔

(۲) نمس در عربی بمعنی سر و صاحب سر و غیره اصلاً و بمعنی جبریل استعاراً
استعمال می شود و همین معانی در صراح مذکور است۔ اینجا مراد از ناموس
شریعت است و درین معانی این لفظ یونانی است۔ به یونانی تلفظ آن
"نومس" به واد مجبول و معنی آن قانون می شود۔ و قانون هم لفظ یونانی است۔
(۳) زیرا که تکلیف شرعی از عامه الناس مرتفع گشته۔

تا بمساعدت معرفت، و تدبیر آیات نبوت، تصدیق توجیه الهی
 بر دل مستولی گشته، دواعی خیر را، که الهامات رحمانی است،
 بر بواعث شر، که وساوس شیطانی است، چیره دیتی دهد - و
 بتلاوت وحی آسمانی، و منشور ربانی، اراده امتثال او امر و
 اجتناب از محارم در جنبش آمده، موجب آن گردد که فعل خیر
 از کمین قوت بموطن فعل جلوه گر گردد^(۱) - و عمل شر در خلوتخانه
 قوت بنقاب عدم محتجب و مستتر ماند^(۲) - و اگر در بعض موارد
 بواسطه عدم تدبیر آیات و تأمل بینات، یا بجهت اعوجاج قریحه^(۳)
 و انکاس فطرت، تصدیق قول شارح محقق نگردد، و یا با وجود
 تصدیق، به سبب غلبه قوای غضبی و شهوانی، به سبب مبداء فطرت،
 و یا بکثرت الف^(۴) و عادت، اراده فعل خیرات و ترک سیئات

(۱) بقیه صفحہ ۲۶ فلسفۃ الی نصر الفارابی مطبوعہ مصر سنہ ۱۳۲۵ھ صفحہ ۶۹

در نظر من این مسئله عقل شرع پیش از بحث منطقی و لفظی نیست -

(۱) یعنی فعل خیر بالاستعداد خیر بالفعل شود -

(۲) یعنی عمل شر که استعداد آن در نفس موجود است به فعل نہ آید -

(۳) عوج یعنی کج شدن ... اعوجاج کج شدن (مراج)

(۴) قریحه اول آبے کہ بر آید انچہ منہ لقال لغلام قرصۃ جیدۃ لایرا تنبیط

العلم بجودۃ الطبع (مراج) معنی قریحه اینجا طبیعت است -

(۵) نکس - نگوں سار کردن انکاس نگوں سار شدن (مراج)

است، قوتِ علم و معرفت، کہ مقتضی توجہ بجناب ملکوت و برکت
از ذائیسِ طبعیہ است، و ولایت نہادہ، و قوائے غضبی و شہوانی
را، کہ باعثِ انہماک در افعالِ سبعیہ و اعمالِ بہیمیہ است،
ارزانی داشتہ، و باعطاء قدرت و ارادہ، کہ صلاحیتِ تعلق
بفہدین دارد،^(۱) اورا در معرضِ تنازع و تخصم انداختہ، کہ
انتسابے بعشرہ^(۲) عقول و ملائکہ دارد، و انجذابے بقبیلہ سبع
و بہائم۔ و برین تخصم و تصادم اساسِ تکلیف نہادہ، و
بارسالی رسل و انزالِ کتب طریقِ خیر را از مسلکِ شر جدا
ساختہ۔ و بہ یکے امر فرمودہ، و از دیگرے نہی نمودہ۔

(بقیہ حاشیہ صفحہ ۲۵) بظاہر کتاب فلاطون مسمی بہ طیمائوس معلوم می شود۔

ممکن است کہ فینا غور شین ہم فوے ازین خیال داشتہ باشند۔ دیلا و اسلامیہ این
نظریہ در قدیم الایام شایع گشت و علماء و حکماء کاغذ و مداد برین صرف نمودند۔ ناظر
متجسس رجوع نماید بہ رسالہ ثانیہ عشرین رسائل اخوان الصفا فی قول الکلماء
ان الانسان عالم صغیر (مطبوعہ بمبئی ۱۳۵۵) القسم الثانی صفحات ۲۹ تا ۲۱۲ در
نظر محشی این نظریہ از تشبیہ بیش نیست۔

(۱) یعنی قوائے علمیہ عقلیہ و قوائے شہوانیہ بہیمیہ کہ احکام ہر دو متضاد یکدیگر باشند۔
(۲) مراد از عقول مجرّدہ۔ ارسطو طالیس بہ پنجاہ دیک و در کتاب دیگر بہ پنجاہ و شش
عقول قائل بود۔ حکماء اسلام بعد از شیخ الرئیس قایل بہ ہمین دہ شدہ اند و
از ان زمان ہمن مدد دہ مقرر و مسلم گشت۔ معلم الثانی ابو نصر فارابی میگوید
» ونحن لا نعلم کمیتہ هذه العقول والافلاك « رعبون المسائل۔ مجموعہ

گویم، تکلیف از علل ناقصه^(۱) تعلق
 جواب مصنفِ علام { اراده است بفعل، که چون با دیگر
 شرائط و اسباب انضمام یابد، تعلق اراده بفعل ازان مترتب
 گردد. و اگر در بعضی محل، مثل تکلیف ابوجل^(۲) بایمان،
 که بواسطه عدم انضمام دیگر اسباب، یا وجود موانع، اثر بران
 ترتیب نه پذیرد لازم نیاید که اصل تکلیف عبث باشد.
 و تحقیق^(۳) کلام درین مقام آن است، که
 توضیح و تائید { ایند غرضان، بمقتضای حکمت ازی و
 مسلک مصنف { مشیت لم یزلی، در سرشت انسانی،
 که نجل اوراق آفرینش، و منتخب دیوان دانش و بینش

(بقیه صفحه ۲۴) (۳۰) صاحب گلشن راز چه خوب می سراید

- ندارد اختیار گذشته مامور + ز به مسکین که شد مختار مجبور
- (۱) رجوع باید نمود به صفحه ۱۵ حاشیه نمبر ۱۰ - علل ناقصه چون مجتمع شود علت مرکبه
 تا مه کامل حاصل گردد و معلول صورت بندد - پس چون یک علت ناقصه
 هم موجود نه بود معلول در وجود نه آید - تکلیف نیز از زمره همین علل ناقصه
 است که چون به دیگر علل و اسباب انضمام و ترکیب یابد علت کامل گردد.
- (۲) اشاره به مسئله تکلیف کافر به ایمان - مراد از ابوجل این جا کفر مجسم است.
- (۳) درین تحقیق هم هیچ تجدد و تفرد نیست زیرا که مطالب مذکوره در کتب حکمیه
 و اخلاقیه از زمان متقدم ثانی بکبریات و مرآت ذکر شده است -
- (۴) اشاره به قول علماء و حکما که انسان عالم صغیر است - سبب این نظریه

نه بر وفق حکمت باشد و مواعظ علماء و نصائح حکماء نه بر طبق
 مصلحت - زیرا که هرگاه علت تامه تعلق اراده بفعل که آن علت
 از اختیارش خارج است، موجود بود، اراده بنده ناچار بفعل
 تعلق گیرد، و به بنی و زجر از ان باز نتوان داشت - و هرگاه
 علت تامه اش موجود نه باشد، حصول تعلق اراده و وجود
 فعل محال بود و بامر و اغراء^(۱) نتوان بر آن آورد - و خلاصه
 سخن آنکه، اگر چه انسان در فعل خود مختار است، لکن اختیارش
 و البته با اضطراب است و تکلیف مضطر^(۲) روا نبود -

است که با اختیار صادر شود - اگر گویند اختیار چون واجب است بغیر پس
 وجودش را در انصاف فعل به قبیح چه تاثیر گوئیم و جوب اختیار به اسباب
 خارج تنها حاصل نه شود بلکه به الفهم نفس فاعل اختیار فعل واجب شود پس نفس
 فاعل جزو اخیر علت تامه فعل باشد اگر گویند نفس فاعل چون موجب و
 مقتضی اراده فعل قبیح است و وجود نفس فاعل هر کثینه مستند است بغیر
 پس عقوبت بر ان قبیح باشد گوئیم عقوبت نظر به بنده شر باشد نه قبیح چه صدر در
 شر مطلقاً قبیح نیست چه شر هرگاه لازم خیر کثیر باشد ترکش قبیح بود چنانکه دانسته
 شد و خیر کثیر درین مقام از جهاد اکثر مردم است به سبب بیم و عید از ارتکاب
 فعل قبیح، مفصل بحث این مسئله در کتب کلامیه و حکمیه مسطور و مرزورست
 (۱) در نسخ منقول عنهما 'نخواند' مسطورست

(۲) اعزاء معصده اعزى وعند النجاة تنبيه المناطبة على امر محمود ليلزمه (محيط المحیط
 صفحه ۱۵۳۰)

ست واقعی، اما نظر بواقع سنخه است ناراست۔^(۱)

مسئله تکلیف شرعی { اگر گوئی^(۲) بنا بر این مقدمات تکلیف عبث بود، و ارسال رسل و انزال کتب

(۱) یعنی تصور امکان در عقل می آید ولی وجود ممکن محض که طرین ۲ آن استواء کامل دارند در حقیقت یافته نمی شود زیرا که استواء کامل مانع حرکت و خروج الی الوجود است۔

(۲) چون کلام مصنف علام به این مقام رسیده اشکالے ثروت و مسئله شگرت و ناکارآمدی که سابقاً در اقتباس از محصل امام رازی اشاره بدان رفت۔ که استناد اراک انسانی به مبادی خارجی مستلزم تاسیس جبریه اشعریه می شود۔ مصنف علام بحث خود را به اتمام نه رسانیده و ازین عقده مشکل قطع نظر کرده توجه قارئین را به مسئله دیگر یعنی جواز تکلیف شرعی منطف ساخته است و بعد از آن به مسائل دیگر پرداخته۔ علماء و حکما را درین مقام تحقیق بلیغ است۔ محقق علاء الدین رزاق لاهیجی در رساله سرمایہ ایمان این مسئله را بسط وافی داده و در کتاب گوهر مراد گفته: «اگر گویند با وجوب اختیار اختیار را چه اثر گوئیم به اثر اختیار همی بس که فعل به آن اختیار می بود نه اضطراری۔ چه فعل اختیاری آنست که مبداءش اختیار باشد اگر گویند چون فعل واجب شود ایجاب لازم آید گوئیم مراد از ایجاب وجوب فعل است نه با اختیار و لزومش ممنوع و اگر مراد وجوب فعل است به سبب اختیار را چه قصور اگر گویند چون فعل قبیح واجب است از غیر بنده بنده را چه گناه گوئیم گناه بنده همی که فعل قبیح با اختیار او صادر شده چه مراد از گناه فعل قبیح

ممتنع است - و تساوی طرفین ممکن، اگر چه در لحاظ دانش امر

(بقیه صفحہ ۲۵) الوجود بذاته ان حصل وجوده کان واجب الوجود بغیره لانه لا یخلو اما ان یصح له وجود بالفعل و اما ان لا یصح له وجود بالفعل و محال ان لا یصح له وجود بالفعل و الاکان ممتنع الوجود بقی ان یصح له وجود بالفعل فحينئذ اما ان یجب وجوده و اما ان لا یجب وجوده و مالم یجب وجوده فهو بعد ممکن الوجود لم یتمیز وجوده عن عدمه و لا فرق بین هذه الحالة فيه و الحالة الاولى لانه قد کان قبل الوجود ممکن الوجود و الان هو بمحاله كما کان فان وضع ان حالاً تجددت فالسؤال عن تلك الحال ثابت هل هي ممکنة الوجود و اوجبة الوجود فان كانت ممکنة الوجود فان تلك الحال كانت قبل ایضاً موجوده على امكانها فلم یتمجد حالة و ان وجب وجودها و هي موجبة للاول فقد وجب لهذا الاول وجود حاله و ليست تلك الحالة الا خروجاً الى الوجود فخروجه الى الوجود واجب و ایضاً فان کل ممکن الوجود فاما ان یكون وجوده بذاته او یكون بسبب ما فان کان بذاته فذاته و اوجبة الوجود و لا ممکنه الوجود و ان کان بسبب فاما ان یجب وجوده مع وجود السبب و اما ان یقی على ما کان علیه قبل وجود السبب و هذا محال فیجب اذا ان یكون وجوده مع وجود السبب فکل ممکن الوجود بذاته فهو انما یكون واجب الوجود بغیره (کتاب النجاة مطبوعه مصر سنه ۱۳۳۱ هـ صفحات ۳۶۸ - ۳۶۹)

سخن دران اراده کنند، یا به دور و یا به تسلسل کشد،^(۱) و هر که^(۲) در امور اختیاری ترجیح بلامرج را جائز داشته، آن را از قضیه کلیه، امتناع ترجیح بلامرج، استثنا کند، همانا که قابل خطاب^(۳) نبوده، زیرا که امثال این تخصیصات در قواعد وضعیه و مصطلحات لغویه جاری تواند شد، نه در قوانین کلیه عقلیه قطعیه - و ازینجاست، آنچه در حکمت^(۴) مقرر شده، که هر چیز در وقت وجود کلاه و جوب بر سر دارد، و هنگام عدم گلیم امتناع در بر - و هر چه بخلعت وجود تشریف یافته، پیر توے از نور و جوب بر و تافته، - ممکن بحت در تنگنائی عدم هم آغوش

(۱) حاصل این که از چنگال این اشکال خلاص نتوان یافت بجز آنکه گفته شود که مرجع خارج از اراده است -

(۲) اشاره به بعض معتزله متقدمین که چنان وجهی متخلص از اشکال ندیدند به قول سخیف قایل شدند که قانون امتناع ترجیح بلامرج در مباحث متعلقه با امور اختیاری جاری نمی شود -

(۳) مراد از قانون کلیه عقلیه که دران استثنا و تخصیص نمی باشد -

(۴) قانون امتناع ترجیح بلامرج از علوم متعارف فن استدلال است پس هر گاه کسی انکار از ان بکن معلوم شود که او را خطی از فن نیست، و مخاطبت و مباحثت بدو عند العقلاء مذموم باشد -

(۵) شیخ الرئیس در الهیات کتاب النجاة نوشته "فقد بان ان کل واجب الوجود بغیر و فهو ممکن الوجود بذاته و هذا ینعکس فیکون کل ممکن

گویم، ہر گاہ کہ تعلق ارادہ مہر یکے بدل دیگرے
 ردِ آں قول { کہ تواند بود، تعلقش یہ یکے نہ بہ دیگرے ترجیح
 یافتن یکے ازدو مساوی بود بے مرجح۔ و عبارتے دیگر، ہر گاہ
 تعلق ارادہ یہ یکے، و عدم تعلقش بدان، ہر دو برابر باشند،
 حصول تعلقش نہ عدش ترجیح بلا مرجح بود۔ و ارادہ مرجح
 این قلع نہ تواند بود۔ زیرا کہ ترجیح ارادہ چیزے راست کہ تعلقش
 بدان چیز بود، و سخن ما در عین تعلق است، و اگر گوئی، کہ
 تواند بود، کہ ارادہ دیگر بتعلق این ارادہ تعلق گرفتہ باشد،

(۱) در حکمت مقرر شدہ کہ ترجیح بلا مرجح باطل است۔
 (۲) در حال استواء تعلق ارادہ بہ فعل و عدم تعلقش بدان ہیچ حرکت
 در جنبش نہ آید و فعل ممتنع گردو پس حدوث فعل و حصول تعلق بہ ارادہ
 نقض استواء دوائی و ترجیح یکے بر دیگرے واجب کند۔ بنابرین چون
 تعلق ارادہ بہ فعل و حدوث فعل ثابت است ناچار بہ مرجح رجوع باید نمود
 و گرنہ ترجیح بلا مرجح لازم خواہد آمد۔ فخرالدین رازی (در کتاب محصل مطبوعہ
 مصر ۱۳۲۳ھ صفحہ ۴۷) گفتہ: “و يقال للمعتزلة متى ثبت هذا الاختيار
 عند استواء الدواعى او عند رجحان احدهما على الاخر الاول باطل لان
 عند الاستواء يتتبع الفعل وعند الامتناع لا يثبت المكنة والثاني محال
 لان حصول المرجح يجب الراجح ويمتنع المرجوح وعلى هذا التقدير لا يثبت
 المكنة، مصنف علام جزا اول استدلال ہذا را درین مقام اختیار فرمودہ و
 و جزو ثانی را بعد ازین نقض فرمودہ زیرا کہ اول مخالف معتزلہ بود و ثانی مخالف
 مسلک مرہین الامرین۔

متساویین بود بے مرجح، پس ہر یکے از دو مساوی، مثل
نشستن و برخاستن، بر دیگرے ترجیح تواند یافت بے مرجح
دیگر۔

احدهما علی الآخر وادردوا امثلة المجائع والعطشان والهاذ
اذا حضرهم رغیفان متساویان وقد حان متساویان وطریقان
متساویان فالتهم یختارون احد هما من غیر ترجیح والذین لا
یمحزون ذالک یقولون الرجحان شیء والعلم بالرجحان شیء
ولعلہ یختار احدھا لوجود الرجحان وان لم یفطن بالوجبات
ومتاخر وھم قالوا بوجوب الرجحان وقال بعضهم بان الطرف
الراجح یکون اولی ولا ینتھى الی حد الوجوب وهو اختیار محمود
الملاى وانکر بعضهم کون الاولیة کافیة لمثل ما مر فی خواص
المسکن وابوالحسنین واصحابہ قالوا عند الداعی یجب الفعل
وعند عدمہ یمتنع وذلک لا ینافی الاختیار فان تفسیر
الاختیار ھو ان یکون الفعل والترك بالقیاس الی القدرة
متساویین وبالقیاس الی الداعی وعدمہ اما واجب او ممتنع
ومن عدم التمییز بین الامرین فی ھذا المسئلة یحدث الاختلاف
المجادی بین القائلین بالایجاب والاختیار لتخصیص المحصل
مطبوعہ مطبعہ سنۃ ۱۲۲۳ھ صفحہ ۷۳) ازین عبارت ظاہر شد کہ مراد از
'بعضے' متقدمین معتزلہ اند۔ مختار مصنف علام درین مسئلہ مذہب متاخرین معتزلہ
است کہ بوجوب رجحان قائلیند۔ ولذا لک متقدمین معتزلہ را نقض فرمودہ۔

تعلق، وجود فعل محال^(۱) باشد، و اگر نه ممکن از علت مستغنی گردد.
و همچنین است سخن در تعلق قدرت و اراده، که هنگام وجود علتش
واجب التحقیق است، و وقت فقدان ضروری العدم -

رفع اشکالات

قول معتزله متقدمین { و آنچه بعضی گفته اند، که اراده صفتی
است که تعلقش ترجیح یکے از دو

(حاشیه صفحه ۱۴) مگر باینکه موجود است و اراده انسان هم در آن علت مشمول فعل لابد
و لازم باشد و اگر نه لزوم بین علت و معلول باقی نماند و این محال است.
(۱) چون علت موجود نیست پس معلول هم معدوم گردد و چنانکه قول شیخ
الرئیس گذشته که رفع علت رفع معلول واجب کند -

(۲) یعنی چون تعلق قدرت و اراده را علت موجود بود تعلق که معلول است
صورت یابد و چون علت موجود نباشد تعلق هم ممکن نباشد -

(۳) علامه نصیر الدین طوسی رحمه الله گفته "اقول الاختیار عند المعتزلة
موضحة صد و الفعل او تركه من القادر تعالى اعيه او عدم
داعية وهو متساوى النسبة الى الطرفين عند عدم اعتبار
الداعي وغير متساويهما عند اعتبار احد هما و متقدموهم
جوزوا صد و احد الطرفين من المختار من غير ترجيح

و از توانی به ادأ^(۱)، سیر نماید به یقین در یابد که آخر این سلسله با دلش^(۲) دیپویسته است و منتها^(۳) این رشته بمبداءش باز بسته و چون چنین باشد، پس هنگام تعلیق قدرت و اراده و اختیار بفعل، با وجود سایر شرایط و اسباب، وجود فعل ضروری بود، و اگر نه تخلف^(۴) معلول از علت لازم آید، و در وقت عدم این

(بقیه حاشیه صفحه ۱۶) (۲) مراد از سواقل اشیاء حسیه مادیه و از عوالمی اشیاء غیر حسیه غیر مادیه است -

(۱) یعنی توانی و ادایل به اعتبار طبقات خلقت - عقول و افلاک از جمله ادایل و عناصر و غیر ذالک از جمله توانی است -
(۲) در نسخه دیگر "بسر" نوشته است -

(۳) یعنی در شجره کون و طبقات خلقت که اجزایش با هم در زنجیر علت و معلول باز بسته معلول آخر با علت اول و به واسطه ان به علت العلل و مسبب الاسباب نسبت قریب دارد رجوع باید نمود به اقتباس از مخصوص الحکم ابو نصر الفارابی که سابقاً بحجیر تحریر در آمد

(۴) شیخ الرئیس ابو علی سینا گفته "وهو العلة فلما فرضت موجوده لازم ان یتبع وجوده المعلول و اذا کان المعلول مرفوعاً لازم ان یمکن ان العلة كانت اولاً مرفوعة حتى صح رفع هذا لان رفع المعلول اوجب رفع العلة فاما العلة فاذا رفعتها وحب رفع المعلول بايجاب رفع العلة التي رفعها" (تسع رسائل فی الحکمة والطبیعات مطبوعه قسطنطنیه ۱۲۹۸ هـ صفحات ۶۸-۶۹) پس مصنف علام گفته که چون علت

بعلت است که آن قدرت و اراده او، بلکه تعلق آن اراده و قدرت تواند بود. همچنانکه تعلق قدرت و اختیار ممکن^(۱)، نه واجب^(۲) جایز است، نه ضروری. پس باین ناچار محتاج بود به مرتبه که جانب وجودش را بر عدم ترجیح دهد و از جهت قطع دور و تسلسل^(۳) باید که آن مرجع غتی گردد با مرے خارج از قدرت و اراده او، که بقدرت و اراده حق تعالی منوط و مربوط بود. و اگر کسی تنگناست ظرف از نظام عالم بکار برده از سوافل^(۴) بحوالی

(متعلق صفحہ ۱۵) اراده و قدرت است بلکه تعلق در شتہ مابین اراده و قدرت انسانی -

(۱) ممکن به اضافت الی الواجب موجود است و فی نفسه بغیر استناد الی الواجب معدوم - یعنی دو جانب دارد یکی جانب وجود دوم جانب عدم که هر دو جانبین بر این ثابت می توان شد پس در تعلق شدن بیک جانب بخلات جانب دیگر محتاج بعلت و مرجع میگردد -

(۲) ترجیح دهنده یعنی ذات واجب الوجود که بوجه اضافت و انتساب بدان ممکن موجود گردد -

(۳) اگر مرجع از خارج قدرت و اراده انسانی خارج نبود علت یک اراده اراده ثانیه و علت آن اراده ثالثه و همچنان الی غیر النہایت خواهد بود و تسلسل لازم خواهد آمد و اگر اراده آخر را علت اراده اول فرض کنند در لازم خواهد شد و دور تسلسل هر دو محال است - پس یا بر تالیف مرجع از قدرت اراده انسانی خارج بود -

و اختیارش اضطراری^(۱) چه همچنان که افالش بواسطه امکان^(۲) محتاج

(بقیة صفحہ ۱۵) من غیره و ینتہی الی الاسباب الخارجة عنه التی لیسبت باختیاره فینتہی الی الاختیار الازلی الذی اوجب ترتیب الكل فی الخارج علی ما هو علیہ فاذہ ان انتہی الی اختیار حادث عاد الکلام الی الراس - در دیگر کتب مذکورہ ہم مسلک مصنف علام بتفصیل و توضیح بموجب دلائل و براہین و امثلہ مسطورست - از خوف تطویل لا طایل اقتباس ازینہا نہ گرفتہ شد (۱) یعنی انسان را در قدرت و اختیار بر افعال و اعمال جبر و اضطرار است اگر چه خود در کردن و نہ کردن افعال اختیار است - ازین جا معلوم شد کہ مسلک مصنف علام نہ جبرست کہ خلاف آن بدیدہ عقل شاہد بدست و نہ تفویض کہ اکثر معتزلات قابل بداند بلکہ امرست بین جبر و تفویض یعنی ' اختیار مجبور' کہ بدان بعض معتزلہ و اکثر فلاسفہ اسلام و جمہور امامیہ قایل اند -

(۲) مسلم ثانی ابو نصر فارابی گفتہ " فنقول ان الموجودات علی ضربین احدہما اذا اعتبرت ذاتہ لم یحیی وجودہ و یسمی ممکن الوجود وان کان ممکن الوجود اذا فرضناہ غیر موجود لم یلزم منہ محال فلا عنی بوجودہ عن علتہ والا شئیاء الممکنۃ لا یجوز ان تمر بلا نہایت فی کونہا علتہ و معلولہ ولا یجوز کونہا علی سبیل الدرد بل لا بد من انتہائہا الی شئی واجب ہو الموجود الاول " رعیون المسائل مشمولہ مجموعہ فلسفہ ابی نصر الفارابی مطبوعہ مصر سنہ ۱۳۲۵ھ صفحہ ۶۶ - حاصل آنکہ انسان ممکن الوجود است - دلہذا بہ علمہ محتاجست در وجود خود - همچنان افعال انسان ممکنست دلہذا بہ محتاج بعلمست در حدوث خود - در بادی النظر این علت افعال ارادہ و قدرت انسان است ولیکن یہ قابل بر تعمق نظر منکشف گرد کہ این نہ خود

مختار است مجبور و قادر است مضطر، که افعالش اختیاری

(بقیه صفحہ ۱۱۳) ہیں گروہ علماء و متکلمین حکماً است کہ مذکور شد۔ درین مقام عبارت
ابونصر فارابی (متوفی ۳۲۰ھ) از کتاب فصوص الحکم بر سبیل تقابل نقل کرده شود۔
فصل ۵۱، کل مال ممکن فکان فله سبب ولن یکون العدم سبباً لـ الحصوله
فی الوجود والسبب اذا لم یکن سبباً ثم صار سبباً - فلسفہ صا رسبباً و
ینتهی الی مبداء ترتب عنه اسباب الاشیاء علی ترتیب علمہ بها
فلن نجد فی عالم الـ کون والفساد طبعاً حادثاً او اختیاراً حادثاً الا عن
سبب و یرتقی الی مسبب الاسباب ولا یجوز ان یکون الانسان
مبتدئاً فاعلاً من الافعال من غیر استناد الی الاسباب الخارجیة الّتی
نیت باختیارہ ولستند تلك الاسباب الی الترتیب والترتیب لستند
الی التقدير والتقدير یستند الی القضاء والقضاء ینبث عن الامر
(فصل ۵۲) فان ظن ظان انه یفعل ما یرید ومختار ما یشاء
استکشف عن اختیارہ هل هو حادث فیہ بعد ما لم یکن او غیر حادث
فان کان غیر حادث فیه لزمان یصحبه ذلك الاختیار منذ اول
وجوده ویلزمان یکون مطبوعاً علی ذلك الاختیار لا ینفک عنه
ولزم القول بان اختیارہ مقتضی فیہ من غیرہ وان کان حادثاً
ولکل حادث سبب محدث فیکون اختیاراً عن سبب اقتضاه و
محدث احدته فاما ان یکون بالاختیار هو او غیرہ فان کان هو بنفسه
فلا یجوز اما ان یکون ایجادہ للاختیار وهذا یتسلسل الی غیر النہایة
و یکون وجود الاختیار فیہ لا بالاختیار فیکون محمولاً علی ذلك الاختیار

مسک مصنف علامہ { دارباب تحقیق فرا ترازین بے پردہ بہ بصیرۃ بصیرت مشاہدہ نموده اند، کہ انسان

(۱) مصنف علامہ مختار خود را از ارباب تحقیق نقل می کند و لذا لک معلوم می شود که او را خیال نفرد و تجدد و اختراع معانی بدیع در رساله نیست و لے در کتب خود این دعوی می کند - فافهم و تدبر - محقق طوسی در تخیص المحصل بعد نقض نظریۃ اشاعره و معتزله گفته "و قال اهل التحقيق في هذا الموضع لا جبر ولا تفويض ولكن امر بين امرين فهذا هو الحق ومن لا يعرف حقيقته وقع في التخيير"،

رحاشیة کتاب المحصل للرازی مطبوعہ مصر ۱۳۲۳ھ صفحہ ۱۴۴-

ہمین است مسک مصنف علامہ - این تحقیق در ملت اسلامیہ بین العلماء و المتکلمین در مائتہ اولی ہجریہ ہم شایع بود و از مائتہ ثانیہ بحیر تحریر آمدن شروع شد - از حجتہ علمائے شریعت اسلام امام جعفر صادق علیہ السلام (متوفی ۱۴۸ھ) در رسالہ خود و شیخ صدوق (متوفی ۳۸۸ھ) در کتاب التوحید و کتاب العقاید و شیخ مفید (متوفی ۴۱۳ھ) در کتاب العقیدہ و سید مرتضی (متوفی ۴۳۶ھ) در کتاب الایمانی و شیخ مطہر الحلی (متوفی ۷۴۸ھ) در کتاب منهاج الصلاح باب ہادی عشر ہین مسک را اختیار نموده اند - از گروہ متکلمین ہشام بن الحکم (متوفی ۱۹۹ھ) در رسالہ خود و امام فخر الدین رازی (متوفی ۶۰۵ھ) در تمام مجلدات تفسیر کبیر و کتاب الربعین وغیرہ سالک ہیں منہج اند - و از زمرہ فلاسفہ اسلام ابو نصر فارابی (متوفی ۳۳۹ھ) در کتاب فصوص الحکم و ابو علی سینا (متوفی ۴۲۸ھ) در تعلیقات و الہیات شفاء و خواص البصیر الدین طوسی (متوفی ۵۴۵ھ) در رسالہ خلق اعمال و کتاب تجرید الکلام و کتاب الفصول و میر باقر داماد (متوفی ۱۲۸۵ھ) در کتاب ایقان ہا ہیں نظریہ را بہرہین قاطعہ و استدلالات ساطعہ مختار خود نموده اند - پس معلوم شد کہ مراد محقق طوسی و مصنف علامہ از "ارباب تحقیق"

و قادر بخت اند - اگر خواهند کنند و اگر نخواهند نه کنند - نه کردن بخت و جوب رسیده، و نه ناکردن بمرتبه ضرورت انجامید - و خالق بخت و قادر مطلق آدمی را مثلاً اقتدار داده، و زمام قدرت در قبضه اختیارش نهاده - انگاه مکارم خصال، و محاسن افعال او را امر فرموده، و از خسائیس خلل، و ذمائم اعمال، نهی نموده - و در جزائے خیرات لذات اخروی را وعده کرده، و به پاداش سیات الام عقی را مقرر ساخته - پس اگر بقصد و اختیار خود راه طاعت سپرد، بسعادت آنجمنانی فائز گردد، و اگر بقدرت و اراده خود طریق عصیان ورزد، بشتقاوت مبتلا آید - و قدرت و اراده الهی را، بعد ایجاد صفت قدرت و اختیار در عباد، اصلاً تعلق بافعال انسانیه نیست و هیچ گونه اکراه و اجبار در حق شان نه - و بوجه استقلال در قدرت و اختیار، انسان، در محاسن و ذمائم افعال و خصال، در او امر و نواهی شرعی الهیه، مریهون ترتب ثواب و عقاب^(۲) می باشد -

(بقیه صفحہ ۱۱) سہ ۳۲۵ مسئلہ ۳۳ صفحات ۱۰۷-۱۰۸) ممکن است کہ بنائے این تسامح استغراق مصنف علام باشد در الہیات و ریاضیات و عدم التفات او بہ نفسیات - قارئین درخواستند این رسالہ این تسامح را ملحوظ دارند تا در فہم عبارات دقت نشود -

(۱) خلال جمع خلہ عادتہا و خصلتہا (منتخب)
(۲) این جملہ مستفہم ضایع و بدایع و بر کمال فصاحت و بلاغت مصنف علام شاہد بعید است -

سایر حیوانات در افعال اختیاریه و حرکات ارادیه، مختار محض.

(بقیه صفحه ۱۰) موجود است که «و القدریة محسوسة هذه الامة» اشاعه معتزله را قدریه می نامند زیرا که نفی جبر و قبال از خدای کنند و معتزله اشاعه را قدریه می نامند زیرا که اثبات جبر و قبال بر خدای کنند. لقب معتزله اصحاب العدل والتوحید است و شهرستانی در بیان عقاید ایشان گفته که «و دائقوا علی ان العبد قادر خالق لا فعاله خیرها و شرها مستحق علی ما یفعله قوابا و عقابا فی الدار الاخرة (الملل والنحل للشهرستانی مطبوعه مطبع بولاق مصر سنه ۱۲۶۳ هجری مجلد اول صفحه ۲۳) مصنف علام عقاید معتزله را بوضوح تمام ایراد فرموده است و نتیج نقد و تنقیح بران نه نموده چنانکه بعد از کراوات دیگر تنقیح و نقد نموده است بلکه در ذکر هم ایجاب بکار برده. و بعد از ادین عقیده چون مختار خود را بیان فرموده نقض این مسلک نکرده بلکه گفته که «فراتر ازین» ازین همه معلوم می شود که عقیده معتزله در نظر مصنف علام ضعیف و ضعیف نبود.

(۴) این است تنقیح بلیغ مصنف علام بر معتزله که نظر ایشان کوتاه و قصیر است و کمال صدق نمی رسد و لذا لک بعد از این از برای اهل تحقیق گفته که ایشان بوسعت نظر فراتر از معتزله مشاهده نموده اند.

(۱) مصنف الفاظ اراده، و اختیار را مرادف شمرده و بدل یکدیگر استعمال فرموده و ناظر بصیر می داند که میان این دو لفظ فرق است چنانکه ابونصر محمد الفارابی معلم ثانی گفته که «الاختیار ان الانسان قد یتقدم فیختار الاشياء الممكنة و تقع ایضا ارادته علی الاشياء غیر ممکنة مثل ان الانسان یتوکل ان لا یموت و الارادة اعم من الاختیار فان کل اختیار ارادة و لیس کل ارادة اختیاریاً» (المسائل الفلسفیه والاجوبه عنها مطبوعه مصر)

و بستن و رفتن، نحوه از اختصاص و تعلق خاص به قدرت و اختیار ما دارد - برخلاف افعال طبیعی جمادات، چون حرکت بمرکز میل خفیف محیط و بر خلاف حرکات قسریه حیوانات، که در اول قدرت و اختیار مفقود است، و در ثانی، اگر چه اختیار ثابت است، لکن تعلقش^(۲) ناموجود -

مسلك معتزله { و از جهت ظهور این معنی، اهل اعتزال^(۳) نظر را بر آن مقصور^(۴) داشته، گمان برده اند، که انسان و

(حاشیه صفحہ ۹) و شرح "کتاب التوحید مطبوعہ مصر صفحہ ۹۷" خلاصہ اینکه جمہور اہل سنت و الجماعت و دہابیان معتقدین جبر اند و منکرین اختیار و عید در افعال و اعمال - مصنف علام اعتقاد ایشان را قطعاً بیان نہ کردہ بلکہ محض کنایہ اظهار براءت خود از ان نمودہ - ازین معلوم شود کہ ایں عقیدہ در نظر حکمیہ مصنف علام رکیک و سحیف بود -

(۱) در نسخہ دیگر "میل ثقیل بمرکز" نوشتہ است -

(۲) یعنی در حرکات قسریہ حیوانات تعلق افعال بہ اختیار مستحق نمی شود مثلاً ثابت نمی شود کہ عنکبوت در ساختن بیت خود و بافتن تار پود قصد و اختیار بعزل آوردہ حرکات و افعال می کند اگر چه در کردن فعل و نہ کردن ان اورا نوعی از اختیار است -

(۳) اہل اعتزال را در عرف معتزله نامند - ایں گروہ مخالف اشاعرہ است کہ نسبت بہ ابو الحسن الاشعری دارند - اشاعرہ بہ جبر محض قایل اند و معتزله بہ اختیار محض - و عجب آنکہ چون حدیث رسول در صحاح معتد علیہ ہر دو گروہ

رساله جبر و اختیار

حکم بدیه عقل و افعال { بر ضمائر ارباب بصائر پوشیده نماند، که بدیهه
قول اشاعره عقل حاکم بعدل و شاهد بصدق است،
بر آنکه افعال اختیاریه، مثل خوردن و خفتن

(۱) بدیهه عقن آن ادراک را گویند که تعقل حالی یا تعقل بلا واسطه بکند و در احکام بدیهه عقل ضرورت به هیچ دلیل نباشد و چه غایت و ضوح و صراحت آن و ایقان فی الفور و با الطبع حاصل گردد - مصنف علام اقوال اشاعره را ازین استشهاد بدیهه عقل یک قلم مرنوع فرموده که گویند بنده در هیچ فعل اختیار ندارد امام اعظم الوضیفه گفته "یحجب ان يقول امننت القدر خیره و شره من الله" (الفقه الاکبر مطبوعه دائره المعارف حیدرآباد صفحه ۳) و نیز گفته نقربان تقدیر الخیر و الشر که من الله تعالی لانه لو زعم ان تقدیر الخیر و الشر من غیره لصار کافرا بالله تعالی و بطل توحیده (کتاب الوصیه - مطبوعه دائره المعارف حیدرآباد صفحه ۷) - و امام ابو الحسن الاشعری گفته که عقایدش و نیز عقاید اهل الحق و السنة آنکه "ان الله لا یسکون فی الارض شیء من خیر و شر الا ما شاء الله و ان الاشیاء تكون بمشیة الله عز و جل و ان احداً الا یتطیع ان یفعل شیئاً قبل ان یفعله" (کتاب الابانیه مطبوعه دائره المعارف حیدرآباد صفحه ۱) محمد بن عبد الوهاب نوشته که "الا یهان ان تو من بالقدر خیره

خاطر نشین، دلکشا، و آئین طرزے، اصابت قرین، حقیقت نما، گزارش
می نماید. دهمانا که تا این هنگام، کس از علماء اعلام، در توضیح و تنقیح
این مطلب ثروت، و مقصد شکر، بدین تدقیق و تحقیق سخن نگفته و
خار و خاشاک و هم و شک از نیج برهان، و طریق ایقان، نرفته، و بالله
التوفیق و بیدار ازمه التحقيق -

(تبعیه من گذشته) جملة الممكن فان مبنى القول فيه على المشهورات و
المقتضات والظنون الحسنة والتقليدات وما يشبهها مما هو في حيز
الممكن وفي مثل هذه فانه ليس من المحال ان تتكافأ الأدلة حتى يوجد
دليل الشئ والحجة على اثباته من القوة والصحة والحسن بالمكان
الذي يؤاويه ويكافئه دليل نقيضه والحجة عليه واما ما كان من
المسائل والعلوم من حيز الضرورة فان مبناها ومعملها يكون على الامور
التي توجد ضرورة اولاً توجد ضرورة وحينئذ يكون دليل الشئ صحيحاً
وقوياً وكذلك الحجة عليه واما الدليل على نقيضه فواهيلاً باطلاً ضعيفاً.
(المسائل الفلسفية والاجوبة عنها مطبوعه مصر سنة ١٣٢٥ م مسئله ٢٧
صفحه ١٠٣ - ١٠٥) چون اضطرار و اختيار انسان در افعال و اعمال خود از امور ممكنه
است در مسئله تعارض دلائل رد نما گردد و مسئله جبر و اختيار را غامض ترين مسائل
گرداند -

(۱) این ست دعوی مصنفِ علام، و ما در مقدمه از حقیقت این دعوی بحث نمودیم و
حدود آن را بیان کردیم - نیز رجوع باید نمود به جواشی در مقامات مترجمه درین رساله -

د قانون ساز، ادا نموده از اخلال و اطلال پر حذر باشند - و اگر چنان که بغیر ازان که خود را بیاد خاطر والا دهند، عرض دیگر نداشته باشند، سزاوار آن بود، که درین معنی به نوشتن مقالاتی مناسب حالت، که گذارش و نگارش آن پسند طبع سخن شناس، و خاطر حق گزین حقیقت اقتباس، تواند بود، توسل جویند - این دعاگو، بنا برین مقدمه، جز عرض مطلب علمی، و مقدمه علمی، لایق حال خود و سزاوار مجلس اعلیٰ ندیده، رسالتی در کمال ایجاز و اختصار، در تحقیق جبر و اختیار، که از راه تعارض دلائل غامض ترین مسائل است، بهین منواله،

(د بقیه صفحه گذشته) (۳) توسط بن افرات و تفریط - یعنی در التماس نه المطالب غیر ضروری باشد و نه حذف امور ضروری -

(۱) السداد بالفتحه الصواب من القول والفعل، (مصباح المنیر)
(۲) معلوم شد که مصنف علام درین رساله کمال ایجاز و اختصار بالقصد اختیار نموده است بنا برین بر قارئین واجب است که در فقرات و الفاننش خوض بلیغ ننماید -
(۳) گنج شدن دو دلیل که ضد یک دیگر باشد در ضعف و قوت هر دو قریب بر سادی بود ابو نصر محمد القارابی معلم ثانی گفته "وسئل عن الادلة هل تنکافأ حتی یوجد للشیء ونقیضه دلیل قوی و یکون دلیل الشئی فی القوة والصحة کدلیل نقیضه أم لا - فقال هذه مسألة اذا اجبت بلا مطلقاً و بنعم مطلقاً فان ذلك غیر صواب والا ولی ان تقسم الامور وتنظر هل هی فی ذالک المعنی بحکم واحد ام هی مختلفة الحکم - فنقول ان الامور منها ضروریة و منها ممکنة ولا یوجد للامور قسم ثالث و جمیع الامور مبناها علی احد هذین وهی کلها محصورة بهذین فای شیء کان من

مکتوب مصنف

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

پیوستہ بہ آب یارئ فیض ربانی، و مددگاری فضل ربانی، برومند
 نہال دولت و اقبالِ خدایگانی، میمویہ و سایہ سرمایہ آرایشِ خوانِ عالم، و
 آرایشِ جانِ بنی آدم باد۔ کترین بندہ، خیر اندیش، اخلاص کیش^(۱)،
 ملا محمود جونپوری، اگرچہ از جہتِ ناتوانی و بیماری، دیبا آوڑن
 لوازمِ خدمتِ گزاری، بکالبدِ جسمانی، و پیکرِ بیولانی، گردِ تقصیر، و غبارِ
 تشویر، از چہرہٗ حالِ پر اختلال، و ناصیہٗ روزگارِ بے ہنجارِ خود شستہ، لکن
 از روئے راستکاری و استواری، در ولاکیشی^(۲) و وفاداری، بجانِ نیازمند
 دروانِ مستمند، وظائفِ دعاگوئی، و مراسمِ ہواخواہی، را تقدیم نمودہ بعض
 باریافتگانِ محفلِ سعادتِ مسکن، و مجلسِ دولتِ مامن، می رساند، کہ عرضہ
 از بندگانِ عقیدت پیوند، بخدمتِ ہمایون خداوند، نویسند۔ اگر مقصود از ان
 التماسِ امرے، یا انہائے خبرے باشد، باید کہ آن را بطریقِ اقتصاد^(۳)،

(۱) این فقرات دلالت می کند کہ فاطمہ مصنف درین مکتوب یکے از امراء سلطان بودہ است نہ
 خود سلطان دہلی۔

(۲) رسانیدن و خبر کردن۔ نَہَا، یَہْو، نَہَوَا (وادی) "انہیت الامرالی المحاکم
 بالالف اعلمتہ بہ" (مصباح المنیر و محیط المحيط)

حرسه الله عن الفساد والكساد، افازني الله تعالى بالرسالتين
 له بشق الانفس، احدى هما في العقائد متين^(١) متين في لسان
 عربي مبين، وثانيهما في الخبر والاختيار بالفارسية، نافعة
 للقلوب الخاشعة والقاسية، فاغتمتهما وحمدت الله على ذلك
 حمد اكبر، وحقمت^(٢) ان يعمر نفعهما كثيرا، سبحان الله والحمد
 لله بكرة واصيلا، ❖

قال العلامة، الخبر الفهامة، شيخ دهره، ومعلم عصره،
 خاتم الحكماء، ورئيس القدر ماء، الملا محمود الجونفوري، تغدك
 الله بالغفران الغفوري ❖

(١) والظاهر ان هذه الرسالة قد ضاعت لان ما وجدتها عند احدٍ
 من احفاده

(٢) والظاهر ان هذه الارادة لم تخرج من خلود القوة الى شهود الفعل
 فان الحافظ عابد حسين ما نشرها تين الرسالتين -

علا شأنه، وسعى مكانه، رجع أسواق الفلسفة والحكمة الإلهية
 بعد كسادها، وهذا بها واضحا، وأسس أسس العلوم الإلهية
 بعد انهدامها وفسادها، ونقحها وأصلحها، فكانت أيوحى إليه
 أعياء، فيجيب به ما فاتهم أحياء، ذوالأصل الطاهر والفضل الباهر
 مولانا الحاج الملامحمد الجونفوري، صاحب الشمس لبازقة
 في الحكمة والفرائد في البيان وغيرهما، إذاقه الله برد غفرانه
 وبهجة بلجة أكرامه، ورضوانه، إن المتقدمين من الحكماء
 الفيلسوفين حازوا حظاً وافراً وفازوا فوزاً متكاثراً، ودونوا من
 الصناعة العلمية، وبينوا المقاصد الحكيمة، وصبغوا بالاجتهاد
 أدبيهم، وانفقوا بعد أعياء نفوسهم نعيمهم، وأخلفوا ذكراً
 لتأريخهم، ولكنه مجلبة الفنون سبقهم، وإن كان آخرهم
 لاحقهم، حيث ظفروا بشيء يقول عند سماعها أولو الألباب،
 ما سمعنا بهذا في الملة الأخيرة، إن هذا الشيء عجاب ولا يخفى
 على من كملت فطنته، وسلمت فطرته، إن سائر مولفاته،
 وقاطبة مصنفاته، مفيدة لطلابها، فريدة في بابها، فلما
 ساعد في الزمان، غيب أوقات وأزمان، دخلت الأله آباد

«هذا اللفظ يدل أن الملاقاة سافر الحجاز وعين أن يكون مسيرة
 من طرق الكابل والفرس والعراق والشام وتويد هارواية سمعتها من
 بعض أفاضل إحقادة»

مقدمه حافظ عابد حسين

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله المتوحد في ذاته، المتفرد بصفاته، المستجمع لجميع صفات الكمال، المنزه عن سمات النقص والزوال، خلق الخلق فاحسن خلقهم، وهذب شأنهم وخلقهم نوربايرهم وظهر سرايرهم، القادر لا باعوان والنصار المدبر لا بخواطرو افكار، والصلوة والسلام على رسوله الذي لم يلحقه في ميادين المجد نجيب، ولم يسيقه في دواوين المدح نسيب، وعلى اله واصحابه الذين ليس لهم عوج وبدلوا الله اموالا ومهجا، اما بعد فيقول الراجي غفران رب الناشئين، الفقير الى الله محمد عبد الله المدعو بعابد حسين، من احفاد اماما المحققين وقدوة الملقين، الهمام المقتد، والمقدام المفخم، خاتم الحكماء، ورئيس العلماء، من شرق شارق البلاغة من افق بيانه، وتفتحت ينابيع الفصاحة من براعه وبنانه، امام البلغاء في زمانه، وخطيب الفصحاء في اوانه، الذي

رسالہ جبر و اختیار

مُصَنَّف

ملا محمود جونپوری

مع

ترجمہ مصنف و مقدمہ و حواشی مبسوطہ و نقد و تبصرہ

از

علی ہدی خاں ایم۔ اے جونپوری

